Abstract: A cryptographic calculation includes obtaining a point P(X,Y) from a parameter t on an elliptical curve Y2=f(X); and from polynomials X1(t), X2(t), X3(t) and U(t) satisfying: f(X1(t))·f(X2(t))·f(X3(t))=U(t)2 in Fq, with q=3 mod 4. Firstly a value of the parameter t is obtained. Next, the point P is determined by: (i) calculating X1=X1(t), X2=X2(t), X3=X3(t) and U=U(t); (ii) if the term f(X1)·f(X2) is a square, then testing whether the term f(X3) is a square in Fq and if so calculating the square root of f(X3) in order to obtain the point P(X3); (iii) otherwise, testing whether the term f(X1) is a square and, if so, calculating the square root of f(X1) in order to obtain the point P(X1); (iv) otherwise, calculating the square root of f(X2) in order to obtain the point P(X2). This point P is useful in a cryptographic application.

Abstract: A cryptographic calculation includes obtaining a point P(X,Y) from a parameter t on an elliptical curve Y2=f(X) and from polynomials satisfying: ?f(X1(t)).f(X2(t))=U(t)2 in the finite body Fq, irrespective of the parameter t, q=3 mod 4. A value of the parameter t is obtained and the point P is determined by: (i) calculating X1=X1(t), X2=X2(t) and U=U(t); (ii) testing whether the term f(X?1) is a squared term in the finite body Fq and, if so, calculating the square root of the term f(X1), the point P having X1 as abscissa and Y1, the square root of the term f(X1), as ordinate; (iii) otherwise, calculating the square root of the term f(X2), the point P having X2, as abscissa and Y2, the square root of the term f(X2), as ordinate. The point P is useful in encryption, scrambling, signature, authentication or identification cryptographic applications.

Abstract: The invention relates to a device (100) for identifying or authenticating a person by a print thereof, the identification or authentication device (100) including: a bearing means (102, 130) including a transparent base (130) and a transparent block (102) supported by said base (130) on which the part of the body carrying the print is pressed, the surface of the transparent block (102) on which the part of the body carrying the print is pressed having a test chart (132), the transparent block (102) being made of a flexible material that deforms and fits the shape of the part of the body carrying the print when the latter is pressed against the former, a means (106, 126) for capturing an image of said print and the test chart (132) through said bearing means (102, 130), a means (108) for analyzing the image of the deformed test chart (132), a means (110) for constructing a template of the print according to the print thus captured and the image of the test chart (132) thus analyzed, a means (114) for verifying

Abstract: Biometric data relating to a biological part are processed by obtaining, on the one hand, a first set of transformed biometric data (f(B1)) by applying at least one irreversible transformation to a first set of biometric data (B1), and, on the other hand, a second set of transformed biometric data (f(B2)) by applying said transformation to a second set of biometric data (B2). Thereafter, a decision is made as to whether the second biometric data set corresponds to the first biometric data set on the basis of a comparison between the first transformed biometric data set and the second transformed biometric data set, said comparison being performed at the bit level of a digital representation of said first and second transformed biometric data sets as a function of an error corrector code word.

Abstract: The invention relates to a gambling terminal comprising a mount (63) for receiving a gambling document belonging to a user and a camera able to acquire an image of the gambling document when the gambling document is placed on the mount, the terminal having a first side intended to face an operator and a second side opposite the first side and intended to face the user, in which the terminal has a first opening (14) arranged on the first side and a second opening arranged on the second side such that the gambling document can be seen simultaneously by the operator and the user while the image is being acquired.

Abstract: In a method for searching for an entity belonging to a set of entities, a verifier device and the entities are arranged so as to exchange information via at least one communication channel. Each entity has a first respective identifier from which a plurality of representatives can be obtained. According to the method, a first identification word (mi; p(Xi)), which is related to an entity for which a search is carried out, is obtained in the verifier device. The first identification word is formed by applying a first encoding function to the first identifier of the entity for which the search is being carried out so as to depend on a sub-portion of the plurality of representatives that can be obtained from said first identifier. The sub-portion is predetermined by at least one variable parameter. The first identification word, obtained on the communication channel, is transmitted from the verifier device.

Abstract: A device is controlled by a controller on the basis of a password. A determination is made at the device or at the controller, on the basis of a random value r1, of a point P(X,Y) on an elliptic curve in a finite body Fq, q being an integer, according to: Ea,b(x, y):x3+ax+b=y2. First and second parameters k and k? are obtained such that P(X,Y)=F(K,k?), where F is a surjective function of Fq×Fq, in Fq. The first and second parameters are obtained in an encrypted format by encryption in accordance with the password. The first and second encrypted parameters are then transmitted to the controller. During the control, the function F is used, such that, whatever the values of z and z? which are input elements of Fq, F(z,z?) is a point on the elliptic curve and the input elements do not satisfy the equation.

Abstract: An imaging device includes a transparent prismatic element having two contiguous inlet surfaces separated by a ridge. A lens and an image sensor make it possible to acquire images, each including a reproduction of a first pattern located against one of the inlet surfaces, and a reproduction of a second imaged pattern through the other inlet surface. Such a device can be used in a biometric detection apparatus for detecting both a skin print and the vein distribution of a user. The device can also be used in a reading terminal capable of detecting a skin print and a machine-readable tape.

Abstract: A cryptographic calculation includes obtaining a point P(X,Y) from a parameter t on an elliptical curve Y2=f(X); and from polynomials X1(t), X2(t), X3(t) and U(t) satisfying: f(X1(t))·f(X2(t))·f(X3(t))=U(t)2 in Fq, with q=3 mod 4. Firstly a value of the parameter t is obtained. Next, the point P is determined by: (i) calculating X1=X1(t), X2=X2(t), X3=X3(t) and U=U(t); (ii) if the term f(X1)·f(X2) is a square, then testing whether the term f(X3) is a square in Fq and if so calculating the square root of f(X3) in order to obtain the point P(X3); (iii) otherwise, testing whether the term f(X1) is a square and, if so, calculating the square root of f(X1) in order to obtain the point P(X1); (iv) otherwise, calculating the square root of f(X2) in order to obtain the point P(X2). This point P is useful in a cryptographic application.

Abstract: A cryptographic calculation includes obtaining a point P(X,Y) from a parameter t on an elliptical curve Y2=f(X) and from polynomials satisfying: ?f(X1(t))·f(X2(t))=U(t)2 in the finite body Fq, irrespective of the parameter t, q=3 mod 4. A value of the parameter t is obtained and the point P is determined by: (i) calculating X1=X1(t), X2=X2(t) and U=U(t); (ii) testing whether the term f(X?1) is a squared term in the finite body Fq and, if so, calculating the square root of the term f(X1), the point P having X1 as abscissa and Y1, the square root of the term f(X1), as ordinate; (iii) otherwise, calculating the square root of the term f(X2), the point P having X2, as abscissa and Y2, the square root of the term f(X2), as ordinate. The point P is useful in encryption, scrambling, signature, authentication or identification cryptographic applications.

Abstract: A database comprising biometric data stored in encrypted form is managed by a management unit. It comprises a set of filters respectively associated with filter identifiers. A biometric data item is received at a management unit; next, said biometric data item is stored in an encrypted form at a given address in the database. Then keywords are obtained on the basis of a first set of hash functions and of the biometric data item. A subset of indexing filters is associated with each keyword by selecting, for each keyword, filters as a function of the respectively associated filter identifiers, of said keywords, and of a second set of hash functions; and the given address is associated with each of the filters of the subset of filters.

Abstract: A smart card has an electronic module and a card body carrying the module. The smart card includes a card body provided with a cavity and an electronic module having at least one portion presenting thickness that is less than the thickness of the card body. The electronic module is housed in the cavity and is secured to the card body. At least one through hole passes in succession through the portion of the module that presents a thickness that is less than the thickness of the card body, and through the card body.

Abstract: The invention relates to a registration method for future biometric verification purposes, including the following steps for one person (I): obtaining first biometric data (4) and second biometric data (5) relating to said person; obtaining alphanumerical data (a) including at least one identifier relating to said person; storing, in a first biometric database (1), the thus-obtained first biometric data in association with a decryption key (6); storing, in a correspondence table (T), first information from the thus-obtained second biometric data and alphanumerical data in correspondence with an index (j); storing, in a second database (2), second information from the thus-obtained second biometric data and alphanumerical data in association with a version (J) of said index that is encrypted with an encryption key corresponding to said decryption key, said second information being different from the first information.

Abstract: A cryptographic calculation is executed in an electronic component, according to a cryptographic algorithm including at least one application of a one-way function which is disabled upon an intrusion into the electronic component. The one-way function is based on a first affine operation corresponding to a first secret key. The one-way function is applied, by obtaining (11) first and second random values (r, r?), then, by obtaining a first result (13) by applying a second affine operation (?K1), which corresponds to a second secret key, to a first combination (12) of the first and second random values, and, by obtaining (14) thereafter a second result by applying a third affine operation (?K2) which corresponds to a third secret key to said first result.

Abstract: An access control system (10) comprises a server (12) suitable for controlling access; a biometric signal sensor (11); and an interface device (13) suitable for hooking up with the server and with the sensor, access being authorized to a person associated with a reference signal. The server and the interface device manage a common parameter that takes different values over time, and, respectively a first and a second non-invertible transformation function, these functions being parameterized as a function of the common parameter. The sensor senses a biometric signal and provides it to the interface device. At the interface device level, a transformed biometric signal is obtained by applying the first function to an element from the group comprising a characteristic emanating from the sensed signal and the sensed signal, then transmitted (14) to the server.

Abstract: In a control system comprising control device adapted for, on the one hand, receiving signal indicating a first biometric datum (W), and, on the other hand, obtaining a second biometric datum captured (w?), at the level of the control device, the first and second biometric date are compared. Next, it is decided whether the first and second biometric data correspond on the basis of the comparison. Thereafter, at least a secret cryptographic key part (H(w)) is generated by applying cryptographic function to the first biometric datum.

Abstract: The method comprises, in an electronic component, carrying out a cryptographic calculation that includes the step of obtaining points P on an elliptic curve following the equation Y2+a1XY+a3Y=X3+a2X2+a4+X+a6 (1) where a1, a2, a3, a4 et a6 are elements of a set A of elements; where A is a ring of modular integers Z/qZ where q is a positive integer resulting from a number I of different prime numbers strictly higher than 3, I being an integer higher than or equal to 2, where A is a finite body Fq with q the power of a prime integer; where X and Y are the coordinates of the points P and are elements of A. The method comprises determining a diameter (11), and obtaining the coordinates X and Y of a point P (13) by applying a function (12) to said parameter. The Euler function ? of A corresponds to the equation ?(A) mod 3=1.

Abstract: A control entity communicates with an entity to be controlled so as to effect a control, a secret key being associated with the control entity. These entities share public parameters, a second public parameter being a combination of a first public parameter of the said plurality with the secret key. At the level of the entity to be controlled, a random value is generated, a first message is transmitted to the control entity, this first message comprising at least one value obtained by combining the first public parameter with the random value; and a second message is transmitted to the control entity, this second message comprising at least one value obtained by combining the first random value, a secret key of the entity to be controlled and a value received from the control entity. One of the values included in the first or the second message is based on the second public parameter.

Abstract: The invention relates to a method for masking the end-of-life transition of an electronic microprocessor device comprising a reprogrammable non-volatile memory containing an end-of-life state variable (FdVE). The value of the variable (FdVE) is loaded (A) into random access memory. Prior to the execution of any current command (COM), the value of the variable (FdVR) in random access memory is checked (B). The end-of-life transition is executed (C) in the event of an empty value. Otherwise, the initialization or the execution of the command (COM) is continued (D). Upon detection (E) of an intrusive attack, the end-of-life state variable (FdVR) is written (F) in the single random-access memory, and the end-of-life state variable (FdVE) is deleted (G) from the non-volatile memory in a delayed manner. The invention is suitable for all electronic devices, microprocessor cards or the like.

Abstract: A method of securing execution of a main program that implements nested functions, the method comprising the steps of executing a security management program arranged to update a list of current functions, informing the security management program of the beginning of execution of each function of the main program and updating the list of current functions, informing the security management program of the end of execution of each function, and, after being informed of each end of execution of a function, verifying that the function is indeed the function that was begun the most recently.