Abstract: Provided are a device and method for generating an identification key using process variation during a bipolar junction transistor (BJT) process. A BJT may be produced by designing such that the effective base width of the BJT is at least a first threshold value but not more than a second threshold value, or, such that the total of the width of a second depletion region formed by connection with a collector region and the width of a first depletion region formed by connection with an emitter region, within a base region, differs from the width of the base region by a value that is at least the first threshold value but not more than the second threshold value. Whether or not there is a short circuit between the emitter region and the collector region is stochastically generated, and if ordinary turn-on voltage is not applied, whether or not there is a short circuit is identified.

Abstract: Provided is an information processing apparatus including a physical unclonable function (PUF) to generate a unique key using a process variation in a semiconductor manufacturing process, and an encryption unit to encrypt a password and/or bio-information received from a user using the unique key.

Abstract: A vehicle security network design device may comprise: a level assigning unit for assigning an automobile safety integrity level (ASIL) which provides a risk management standard for each of a plurality of functional elements in a vehicle that is at least temporarily implemented by a processor; a calculation unit for calculating device's controllability with respect to each of the plurality of functional elements on the basis of a connection structure between the plurality of functional elements and a difference value of the ASIL; and a management unit for generating a risk analysis model of a plurality of functional elements.

Abstract: An IC chip for preventing an authentication key from leaking, and an authentication key setting and authentication key verifying method are provided. A part performing connection or disconnection between an external terminal and a smartcard chip may be configured by a separate chip or may be incorporated into the smartcard chip to configure a single chip. When the part is configured by the separate chip, the disconnection between the external terminal and the smart card chip can be performed according to whether an authentication key is verified. When the part is configured by the one chip, the disconnection between the external terminal and the smart card chip can be performed under a control of the smartcard chip according to whether the authentication key is verified.

Abstract: Provided is an apparatus for generating an identification key by a probabilistic determination of a short occurring between nodes constituting a circuit, by violating a design rule provided during a semiconductor manufacturing process. The identification key generating apparatus may include an identification key generator to generate an identification key based on whether a contact or a via used to electrically connect conductive layers in a semiconductor chip shorts the conductive layers, and an identification key reader to read the identification key by reading whether the contact or the via shorts the conductive layers.

Abstract: A randomness testing apparatus is disclosed. A randomness testing apparatus according to an embodiment includes a randomness testing module to conduct a randomness test on physically unclonable function (PUF)-based hardware and a processing device to determine whether the PUF-based hardware is defective on the basis of a randomness test result.

Abstract: Provided are a device and method for generating an identification key using process variation during a bipolar junction transistor (BJT) process. A BJT may be produced by designing such that the effective base width of the BJT is at least a first threshold value but not more than a second threshold value, or, such that the total of the width of a second depletion region formed by connection with a collector region and the width of a first depletion region formed by connection with an emitter region, within a base region, differs from the width of the base region by a value that is at least the first threshold value but not more than the second threshold value. Whether or not there is a short circuit between the emitter region and the collector region is stochastically generated, and if ordinary turn-on voltage is not applied, whether or not there is a short circuit is identified.

Abstract: Provided is a device for generating an identification key using a process variation during a manufacturing process of a conductive layer. The device for generating an identification key may include a plurality of conductive layers designed so as to be formed in a first region within a semiconductor chip, the density in which the plurality of conductive layers are disposed in the first region being at least a first threshold value and not more than a second threshold value, the first and second threshold values being less than a minimum density according to the design rules for ensuring that all of the plurality of conductive layers are formed in the first region; and a reader which provides an identification key by identifying if, among the plurality of conductive layers, a previously designated first conductive layer has been formed.

Abstract: Disclosed is a secure semiconductor chip. When a physical attack such as a depackaging attack occurs, the semiconductor chip can detect the physical attack. A semiconductor chip according to one embodiment comprises an energy harvesting element inside a package. The energy harvesting element may comprise, for example, an on-chip photodiode. A depackaging attack causes the generation of a voltage of a photodiode, and thus a change in physical state of the packaging can be detected.

Abstract: A semiconductor chip may comprise: a processor for processing data; a shield which includes a metal line and is arranged over an upper portion of the processor; a detection unit for comparing a reference signal with an output signal, which is outputted when the reference signal passes through the shield, so as to detect whether there has been a wiring change within the shield or not; and a controller for configuring the routing topology of the metal line to be in a first state, and changing the routing topology from the first state to a second state.

Abstract: Provided are an apparatus and a method for generating an identification key with improved reliability by: providing a plurality of resistances which are generated according to a random connection state between conductive layers of a semiconductor due to process variation of the semiconductor; discriminating a first group which has a resistance value greater than a first threshold value and less than a second threshold value among the plurality of resistances; and reading at least one resistance which does not belong to the first group out of the plurality of resistances and reading an identification key in the form of a digital value.

Abstract: Provided is an apparatus for generating digital values to provide a random digital value. The apparatus may generate the digital value based on a semiconductor process variation. The apparatus may include a generating unit to generate a plurality of digital values, based on the semiconductor process variation, and a processing unit to process the digital values and to provide a first digital value. The generating unit may include a plurality of physically unclonable functions (PUFs). A parameter may be differently applied to the PUFs, and the PUFs may generate the digital values.

Abstract: Provided is an information processing apparatus including a physical unclonable function (PUF) to generate a unique key using a process variation in a semiconductor manufacturing process, and an encryption unit to encrypt a password and/or bio-information received from a user using the unique key.

Abstract: Provided is a PUF by which an identification key is generated according to a random event caused by a semiconductor process variation. The PUF can provide the identification key as a result of electrical differences among elements. According to one embodiment, the PUF can accumulate the electrical differences and/or instantaneous values without generating the identification key by using the instantaneous values caused by the electrical differences. The accumulation may be the accumulation of a discrete iteration and the result thereof. However, according to another embodiment, the accumulation may be a continuation of the accumulation result during time intervals.

Abstract: Provided are a security apparatus and an operation method thereof. The security apparatus comprises a core circuit which performs a security function by using an authentication key such as a secret key provided by a physically unclonable function (PUF). The security apparatus may receive event information indicating that the security apparatus is in a security-vulnerable state such as a case where the security apparatus is stolen or lost. In such case, a power management circuit can apply at least one electrical shock of overvoltage and overcurrent to the security apparatus to cause physical damage to the security apparatus, so that the core circuit does not perform the security function normally.

Abstract: An apparatus for generating an identification key is provided. The apparatus may include a first conductive layer formed on a semiconductor chip, a second conductive layer formed on the semiconductor chip, wherein a spacing between the first conductive layer and the second conductive layer is equal to or greater than a first threshold and equal to or less than a second threshold, and a reader configured to determine whether a first node associated with the first conductive layer and a second node associated with the second conductive layer are shorted, and to provide an identification key.

Abstract: Provided is an apparatus for generating digital values to provide a random digital value. The apparatus may generate the digital value based on a semiconductor process variation. The apparatus may include a generating unit to generate a plurality of digital values, based on the semiconductor process variation, and a processing unit to process the digital values and to provide a first digital value. The generating unit may include a plurality of physically unclonable functions (PUFs). A parameter may be differently applied to the PUFs, and the PUFs may generate the digital values.

Abstract: A security system capable of preventing a security attack/threat on a vehicle network is provided. At least one security zone is set by using a risk level which is evaluated for a plurality of vehicle functional elements. In addition, a security countermeasure corresponding to the risk level of the security zone can be provided to a conduit of the security zone so as to perform gate keeping.

Abstract: Provided is an apparatus for generating an identification key by using process variation in a conductive layer manufacturing process. The apparatus may include a first contact connected to a first conductive layer included in a semiconductor chip, wherein a first node is formed by an electrical connection between the first conductive layer and the first contact, a second contact connected to a second conductive layer included in the semiconductor chip, wherein a second node is formed by an electrical connection between the second conductive layer and the second contact, and wherein a value of a spacing between the first contact and the second contact is smaller than a minimum spacing value that guarantees that the first node and the second node are not shorted on a patterning layout, and a reader configured to determine whether the first node and the second node are electrically shorted and to provide the identification key.

Abstract: Provided are a device and a method for generating an identification key by using a process variation in a semiconductor process. A semiconductor is manufactured by adjusting a gate side edge position of a contact such that a difference between a probability that a gate of a transistor is shorted from a drain or a source by the contact and a probability that the gate is not shorted is less than or equal to a predetermined threshold. When the manufactured semiconductor does not have a separate process, whether there is a short circuit between the gate and the drain or the source is stochastically generated by the process variation, whether there is a short circuit is detected through a reader, and an identification key is provided.