Abstract: A network can operate a WiFi access point with credentials. An unconfigured device can (i) support a Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP), (ii) record responder bootstrap public and private keys, and (iii) be marked with a tag. The network can record initiator bootstrap public and private keys, as well as derived initiator ephemeral public and private keys. An initiator can (i) operate a DPP application, (ii) read the tag, (iii) establish a secure and mutually authenticated connection with the network, and (iv) send the network data within the tag. The network can record the responder bootstrap public key and derive an encryption key with the (i) recorded responder bootstrap public key and (ii) derived initiator ephemeral private key. The network can encrypt credentials using the derived encryption key and send the encrypted credentials to the initiator, which can forward the encrypted credentials to the device, thereby supporting a device configuration.

Abstract: A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a received eUICC profile and a set of cryptographic algorithms. The received eUICC profile can include an initial shared secret key for authentication with a wireless network. The module can receive a key K network token and send a key K module token to the wireless network. The module can use the key K network token, a derived module private key, and a key derivation function to derive a secret shared network key K that supports communication with the wireless network. The wireless network can use the received key K module token, a network private key, and the key derivation function in order to derive the same secret shared network key K derived by the module. The module and the wireless network can subsequently use the mutually derived key K to communicate using traditional wireless network standards.

Abstract: A device can (i) store public keys Ss and Sn for a network and (ii) record private key sd. A network can record a corresponding private keys ss and sn. The device can (i) generate a device ephemeral PKI key pair (Ed, ed) and (ii) send public key Ed to the network. The device can receive an ephemeral public key Es from the network. The device can calculate values for A: an elliptic curve point addition over Ss, Sn, and Es, and B: (sd+ed) mod n. The device can input values for X and Y into an elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange (ECDH) in order to determine a mutually derived shared secret X5, where the network can also derive shared secret X5. The device can (i) use X5 to derive a key K2 and (ii) decrypt a ciphertext from the network using key K2.

Abstract: A device can (i) operate a primary platform (PP) within a tamper resistant element (TRE) and (ii) receive encrypted firmware images for operating within the primary platform. The TRE can store in nonvolatile memory of the TRE (i) a PP static private key (SK-static.PP), (ii) a server public key (PK.IDS1), and (iii) a set of cryptographic parameters. The TRE can generate a one-time PM key pair of SK-OT1.PP and PK-OT1.PP and send the public key PK-OT1.PP to a server. The TRE can receive a one-time public key from the server comprising PK-OT1.IDS1. The TRE can derive a ciphering key using an elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange and the SK-static.PP, SK-OT1.PP, PK.IDS1, and PK-OT1.IDS1 keys. The TRE can decrypt the encrypted firmware using the derived ciphering key. The primary platform can comprise a smart secure platform (SSP) and the decrypted firmware can comprise a virtualized image for the primary platform.

Abstract: A set of servers can support secure and efficient “Machine to Machine” communications using an application interface and a module controller. The set of servers can record data for a plurality of modules in a shared module database. The set of servers can (i) access the Internet to communicate with a module using a module identity, (i) receive server instructions, and (iii) send module instructions. Data can be encrypted and decrypted using a set of cryptographic algorithms and a set of cryptographic parameters. The set of servers can (i) receive a module public key with a module identity, (ii) authenticate the module public key, and (iii) receive a subsequent series of module public keys derived by the module with a module identity. The application interface can use a first server private key and the module controller can use a second server private key.

Abstract: A network with a set of servers can support authentication from a module, where the module includes an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC). The network can send a first network module identity, a first key K, and an encrypted second key K for an eUICC profile to an eUICC subscription manager. The second key K can be encrypted with a symmetric key. The module can receive and activate the eUICC profile, and the network can authenticate the module using the first network module identity and the first key K. The network can (i) authenticate the user of the module using a second factor, and then (ii) send the symmetric key to the module. The module can decrypt the encrypted second key K using the symmetric key. The network can authenticate the module using the second key K. The module can comprise a mobile phone.

Abstract: A network can operate a WiFi access point with credentials. An unconfigured device can (i) support a Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP), (ii) record responder bootstrap public and private keys, and (iii) be marked with a tag. The network can record initiator bootstrap public and private keys, as well as derived initiator ephemeral public and private keys. An initiator can (i) operate a DPP application, (ii) read the tag, (iii) establish a secure and mutually authenticated connection with the network, and (iv) send the network data within the tag. The network can record the responder bootstrap public key and derive an encryption key with the (i) recorded responder bootstrap public key and (ii) derived initiator ephemeral private key. The network can encrypt credentials using the derived encryption key and send the encrypted credentials to the initiator, which can forward the encrypted credentials to the device, thereby supporting a device configuration.

Abstract: A network with a set of servers can support authentication from a module, where the module includes an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC). The network can send a first network module identity, a first key K, and an encrypted second key K for an eUICC profile to an eUICC subscription manager. The second key K can be encrypted with a symmetric key. The module can receive and activate the eUICC profile, and the network can authenticate the module using the first network module identity and the first key K. The network can (i) authenticate the user of the module using a second factor, and then (ii) send the symmetric key to the module. The module can decrypt the encrypted second key K using the symmetric key. The network can authenticate the module using the second key K. The module can comprise a mobile phone.

Abstract: Methods and systems are provided for supporting efficient and secure “Machine-to-Machine” (M2M) communications using a module, a server, and an application. A module can communicate with the server by accessing the Internet, and the module can include a sensor and/or an actuator. The module, server, and application can utilize public key infrastructure (PKI) such as public keys and private keys. The module can internally derive pairs of private/public keys using cryptographic algorithms and a first set of parameters. A server can authenticate the submission of derived public keys and an associated module identity. The server can use a first server private key and a second set of parameters to (i) send module data to the application and (ii) receive module instructions from the application. The server can use a second server private key and the first set of parameters to communicate with the module.

Abstract: Methods and systems are provided for supporting efficient and secure “Machine-to-Machine” (M2M) communications using a module, a server, and an application. A module can communicate with the server by accessing the Internet, and the module can include a sensor and/or an actuator. The module, server, and application can utilize public key infrastructure (PKI) such as public keys and private keys. The module can internally derive pairs of private/public keys using cryptographic algorithms and a first set of parameters. A server can authenticate the submission of derived public keys and an associated module identity. The server can use a first server private key and a second set of parameters to (i) send module data to the application and (ii) receive module instructions from the application. The server can use a second server private key and the first set of parameters to communicate with the module.

Abstract: Methods and systems are provided for power management and security for wireless modules in “Machine-to-Machine” communications. A wireless module operating in a wireless network and with access to the Internet can efficiently and securely communicate with a server. The wireless network can be a public land mobile network (PLMN) that supports wireless wide area network technology including 3rd generation (3G) and 4th generation (4G) networks, and future generations as well. The wireless module can (i) utilize sleep and active states to monitor a monitored unit with a sensor and (ii) communicate with wireless network by utilizing a radio. The wireless module can include power control steps to reduce the energy consumed after sending sensor data by minimizing a tail period of a radio resource control (RRC) connected state.

Abstract: Methods and systems are provided for efficient and secure “Machine-to-Machine” (M2M) between modules and servers. A module can communicate with a server by accessing the Internet, and the module can include a sensor and/or actuator. The module and server can utilize public key infrastructure (PKI) such as public keys to encrypt messages. The module and server can use private keys to generate digital signatures for datagrams sent and decrypt messages received. The module can internally derive pairs of private/public keys using cryptographic algorithms and a set of parameters. A server can use a shared secret key to authenticate the submission of derived public keys with an associated module identity. For the very first submission of a public key derived the module, the shared secret key can comprise a pre-shared secret key which can be loaded into the module using a pre-shared secret key code.

Abstract: A network can operate a WiFi access point with credentials. An unconfigured device can support a Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP), and record bootstrap public keys and initiator private keys. The network can record bootstrap public and responder private keys and operate a DPP server. A responder proxy can establish a secure and mutually authenticated connection with the network. The network can (i) derive responder ephemeral public and private keys, (ii) record the initiator bootstrap public key, and (iii) select a responder mode for the responder. The network can derive an encryption key with at least the (i) recorded the initiator bootstrap public key and (ii) derived responder ephemeral private key. The network can encrypt credentials using at least the derived encryption key and send the encrypted credentials through the responder proxy to the initiator, which can forward the encrypted credentials to the device, thereby supporting a device configuration.

Abstract: A network can operate a WiFi access point with credentials. An unconfigured device can (i) support a Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP), (ii) record responder bootstrap public and private keys, and (iii) be marked with a tag. The network can record initiator bootstrap public and private keys, as well as derived initiator ephemeral public and private keys. An initiator can (i) operate a DPP application, (ii) read the tag, (iii) establish a secure and mutually authenticated connection with the network, and (iv) send the network data within the tag. The network can record the responder bootstrap public key and derive an encryption key with the (i) recorded responder bootstrap public key and (ii) derived initiator ephemeral private key. The network can encrypt credentials using the derived encryption key and send the encrypted credentials to the initiator, which can forward the encrypted credentials to the device, thereby supporting a device configuration.

Abstract: A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a profile for the eUICC. The profile can include a first and second shared secret key K for authenticating with a wireless network. The first shared secret key K can be encrypted with a first key, and the second shared secret key K can be encrypted with a second key. The module can (i) receive the first key, (ii) decrypt the first shared secret key K with the first key, and (iii) subsequently authenticate with the wireless network using the plaintext first shared secret key K. The wireless network can authenticate the user of the module using a second factor. The module can then (i) receive the second key, (ii) decrypt the second shared secret key K, and (iii) authenticate with the wireless network using the second shared secret key K. The module can comprise a mobile phone.

Abstract: A wireless device with transducers can support remote monitoring and include an 802.11 compatible radio and a set of device default credentials. The device can be installed at a physical location with service from a fixed access point operating with a different set of owner credentials. A mobile phone can (i) scan a tag for the device and download a set of configuration parameters for the device, and (ii) authenticate with a configuration system. The mobile phone can receive the set of device default credentials from the configuration system. The mobile phone can activate a mobile access point using the set of device default credentials. The device can connect with the mobile phone's access point and receive a ciphertext with the owner credentials and a configuration package. The device can apply the configuration package and load the owner credentials in order to connect with the fixed access point.

Abstract: A module such as an M2M device or a mobile phone can include a removable data storage unit. The removable data storage unit can include a nonvolatile memory, a noise amplifying memory, and a cryptographic unit. The nonvolatile memory can include (i) shared memory for access by both the module and the cryptographic unit, and (ii) protected memory accessible only by the cryptographic unit. The cryptographic unit can use a noise memory interface and noise amplifying operations in order to increase and distribute bit errors recorded in the noise amplifying memory. The cryptographic unit can (i) generate a random number using the noise amplifying memory and (ii) input the random number into a set of cryptographic algorithms in order to internally derive a PM key pair. The private key can be recorded in protected memory and the public key signed by a certificate authority.

Abstract: A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a profile for the eUICC. The profile can include a first and second shared secret key K for authenticating with a wireless network. The first shared secret key K can be encrypted with a first key, and the second shared secret key K can be encrypted with a second key. The module can (i) receive the first key, (ii) decrypt the first shared secret key K with the first key, and (iii) subsequently authenticate with the wireless network using the plaintext first shared secret key K. The wireless network can authenticate the user of the module using a second factor. The module can then (i) receive the second key, (ii) decrypt the second shared secret key K, and (iii) authenticate with the wireless network using the second shared secret key K. The module can comprise a mobile phone.

Abstract: A network with a set of servers can support authentication from a module, where the module includes an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC). The network can send a first network module identity, a first key K, and an encrypted second key K for an eUICC profile to an eUICC subscription manager. The second key K can be encrypted with a symmetric key. The module can receive and activate the eUICC profile, and the network can authenticate the module using the first network module identity and the first key K. The network can (i) authenticate the user of the module using a second factor, and then (ii) send the symmetric key to the module. The module can decrypt the encrypted second key K using the symmetric key. The network can authenticate the module using the second key K. The module can comprise a mobile phone.

Abstract: A module such as an M2M device or a mobile phone can include a removable data storage unit. The removable data storage unit can include a nonvolatile memory, a noise amplifying memory, and a cryptographic unit. The nonvolatile memory can include (i) shared memory for access by both the module and the cryptographic unit, and (ii) protected memory accessible only by the cryptographic unit. The cryptographic unit can use a noise memory interface and noise amplifying operations in order to increase and distribute bit errors recorded in the noise amplifying memory. The cryptographic unit can (i) generate a random number using the noise amplifying memory and (ii) input the random number into a set of cryptographic algorithms in order to internally derive a PKI key pair. The private key can be recorded in protected memory and the public key signed by a certificate authority.