Abstract: A processor includes a processor core. A register of the core is to store: a bit range for a number of address bits of physical memory addresses used for key identifiers (IDs), and a first key ID to identify a boundary between non-restricted key IDs and restricted key IDs of the key identifiers. A memory controller is to: determine, via access to bit range and the first key ID in the register, a key ID range of the restricted key IDs within the physical memory addresses; access a processor state that a first logical processor of the processor core executes in an untrusted domain mode; receive a memory transaction, from the first logical processor, including an address associated with a second key ID; and generate a fault in response to a determination that the second key ID is within a key ID range of the restricted key IDs.

Abstract: Implementations described provide hardware support for the co-existence of restricted and non-restricted encryption keys on a computing system. Such hardware support may comprise a processor having a core, a hardware register to store a bit range to identify a number of bits, of physical memory addresses, that define key identifiers (IDs) and a partition key ID identifying a boundary between non-restricted and restricted key IDs. The core may allocate at least one of the non-restricted key IDs to a software program, such as a hypervisor. The core may further allocate a restricted key ID to a trust domain whose trust computing base does not comprise the software program. A memory controller coupled to the core may allocate a physical page of a memory to the trust domain, wherein data of the physical page of the memory is to be encrypted with an encryption key associated with the restricted key ID.

Abstract: A processor includes a processor core to execute an application; a key attribute table (KAT) register to store a plurality of key identifiers (KeyIDs) associated with the application, wherein a KeyID identifies an encryption key; a selection circuit coupled to the KAT register to select the KeyID from the KAT register based on a KeyID selector (KSEL), wherein the KSEL is associated with a page of memory to which access is performed; a cache coupled to the processor core, the cache to store a physical address, data, and the KeyID of the page of memory, wherein the KeyID is an attribute associated with the page of memory; and a memory controller coupled to the cache to encrypt, based on the encryption key identified by the KeyID, the data of the page of memory stored in the cache as it is evicted from the cache to main memory.

Abstract: An integrated circuit includes a core and memory controller coupled to a last level cache (LLC). A first key identifier for a first program is associated with physical addresses of memory that store data of the first program. To flush and invalidate cache lines associated with the first key identifier, the core is to execute an instruction (having the first key identifier) to generate a transaction with the first key identifier. In response to the transaction, a cache controller of the LLC is to: identify matching entries in the LLC by comparison of first key identifier with at least part of an address tag of a plurality of entries in a tag storage structure of the LLC, the matching entries associated with cache lines of the LLC; write back, to the memory, data stored in the cache lines; and mark the matching entries of the tag storage structure as invalid.

Abstract: A processing core comprising instruction execution logic circuitry and register space. The register space to be loaded from a VMCS, commensurate with a VM entry, with information indicating whether a service provided by the processing core on behalf of the VMM is enabled. The instruction execution logic to, in response to guest software invoking an instruction: refer to the register space to confirm that the service has been enabled, and, refer to second register space or memory space to fetch input parameters for said service written by said guest software.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus relating to lightweight trusted tasks are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes a memory interface to a memory to store code, data, and stack segments for a lightweight-trusted task (LTT) mode task and for another task, a LTT control and status register including a lock bit, a processor core to enable LTT-mode, configure the LTT-mode task, and lock down the configuration by writing the lock bit, and a memory protection circuit to: receive a memory access request from the memory interface, the memory access request being associated with the other task, determine whether the memory access request is attempting to access a protected memory region of the LTT-mode task, and protect against the memory access request accessing the protected memory region of the LTT-mode task, regardless of a privilege level of the other task, and regardless of whether the other task is also a LTT-mode task.

Abstract: Apparatuses, methods and storage medium associated with application execution enclave memory page cache management, are disclosed herein. In embodiments, an apparatus may include a processor with processor supports for application execution enclaves; memory organized into a plurality of host physical memory pages; and a virtual machine monitor to be operated by the processor to manage operation of virtual machines. Management of operation of the virtual machines may include facilitation of mapping of virtual machine-physical memory pages of the virtual machines to the host physical memory pages, including maintenance of an unallocated subset of the host physical memory pages to receive increased security protection for selective allocation to the virtual machines, for virtualization and selective allocation to application execution enclaves of applications of the virtual machines. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.

Abstract: This disclosure is directed to a system for address mapping and translation protection. In one embodiment, processing circuitry may include a virtual machine manager (VMM) to control specific guest linear address (GLA) translations. Control may be implemented in a performance sensitive and secure manner, and may be capable of improving performance for critical linear address page walks over legacy operation by removing some or all of the cost of page walking extended page tables (EPTs) for critical mappings. Alone or in combination with the above, certain portions of a page table structure may be selectively made immutable by a VMM or early boot process using a sub-page policy (SPP). For example, SPP may enable non-volatile kernel and/or user space code and data virtual-to-physical memory mappings to be made immutable (e.g., non-writable) while allowing for modifications to non-protected portions of the OS paging structures and particularly the user space.

Abstract: Systems, apparatuses, methods, and computer-readable media are provided for device interface management. A device includes a device interface, a virtual machine (VM) includes a device driver, both to facilitate assignment of the device to the VM, access of the device by the VM, or removal of the device from being assigned to the VM. The VM is managed by a hypervisor of a computing platform coupled to the device by a computer bus. The device interface includes logic in support of a device management protocol to place the device interface in an unlocked state, a locked state to prevent changes to be made to the device interface, or an operational state to enable access to device registers of the device by the VM or direct memory access to memory address spaces of the VM, or an error state. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.

Abstract: A system may include a root port and an endpoint upstream port. The root port may include transaction layer hardware circuitry to determine, by logic circuitry at a transaction layer of a protocol stack of a device, that a packet is to traverse to a link partner on a secure stream, authenticate a receiving port of the link partner, configure a transaction layer packet (TLP) prefix to identify the TLP as a secure TLP, associating the secure TLP with the secure stream, apply integrity protection and data encryption to the Secure TLP, transmit the secure TLP across the secure stream to the link partner.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: Secure memory repartitioning technologies are described. Embodiments of the disclosure may include a processing device including a processing core and a memory controller coupled between the processor core and a memory device. The memory device includes a memory range including a section of convertible pages that are convertible to secure pages or non-secure pages. The processor core is to receive a non-secure access request to a page in the memory device, responsive to a determination, based on one or more secure state bits in one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a secure page, insert an abort page address into a translation lookaside buffer, and responsive to a determination, based on the one or more secure state bits in the one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a non-secure page, insert the page into the translation lookaside buffer.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a processor includes a plurality of cores to execute instructions, a first identification register having a first field to store a feedback indicator to indicate to an operating system (OS) that the processor is to provide hardware feedback information to the OS dynamically and a power controller coupled to the plurality of cores. The power controller may include a feedback control circuit to dynamically determine the hardware feedback information for at least one of the plurality of cores and inform the OS of an update to the hardware feedback information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a processor includes at least one core and an interface circuit to interface the at least one core to additional circuitry of the processor. In response to an in-field self test instruction, at least one core may save state to a low power memory, enter into a diagnostic sleep state and execute an in-field self test in the diagnostic sleep state in which the at least one core appears to be inactive. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Embodiments of processors, methods, and systems for a processor core supporting processor identification instruction spoofing are described. In an embodiment, a processor includes an instruction decoder and processor identification instruction spoofing logic. The processor identification spoofing logic is to respond to a processor identification instruction by reporting processor identification information from a processor identification spoofing data structure. The processor identification spoofing data structure is to include processor identification information of one or more other processors.

Abstract: Techniques and mechanisms for configuring services which variously facilitate data protection. In an embodiment, circuitry coupled to a memory comprises both a first circuit which calculates integrity information based on data, and a second circuit which evaluates data validity based on such integrity information. A configuration of the circuitry provides a combination of one or more services which is specific to a corresponding domain of the memory. With respect to accesses to the corresponding domain, the configuration prevents an access to the first circuit while an access to the second circuit is permitted. In another embodiment, a processor signals the circuitry to transition to another configuration which, with respect to accesses to the corresponding domain, permits access to both the first circuit and the second circuit.

Abstract: A processor implementing techniques for processor extensions to protect stacks during ring transitions is provided. In one embodiment, the processor includes a plurality of registers and a processor core, operatively coupled to the plurality of registers. The plurality of registers is used to store data used in privilege level transitions. Each register of the plurality of registers is associated with a privilege level. An indicator to change a first privilege level of a currently active application to a second privilege level is received. In view of the second privilege level, a shadow stack pointer (SSP) stored in a register of the plurality of registers is selected. The register is associated with the second privilege level. By using the SSP, a shadow stack for use by the processor at the second privilege level is identified.

Abstract: Instructions and logic provide advanced paging capabilities for secure enclave page caches. Embodiments include multiple hardware threads or processing cores, a cache to store secure data for a shared page address allocated to a secure enclave accessible by the hardware threads. A decode stage decodes a first instruction specifying said shared page address as an operand, and execution units mark an entry corresponding to an enclave page cache mapping for the shared page address to block creation of a new translation for either of said first or second hardware threads to access the shared page. A second instruction is decoded for execution, the second instruction specifying said secure enclave as an operand, and execution units record hardware threads currently accessing secure data in the enclave page cache corresponding to the secure enclave, and decrement the recorded number of hardware threads when any of the hardware threads exits the secure enclave.

Abstract: Systems, apparatuses, methods, and computer-readable media are provided for reducing or eliminating cryptographic waste for link protection in computer buses. In various embodiments, data packets are encrypted/decrypted in accordance with advanced encryption standard (AES) Galois counter mode (GCM) encryption/decryption. Monotonically increased counter values are used as initialization vectors; and/or accumulated MAC is practiced to reduce or eliminate cryptographic waste. Other related aspects are also described and/or claimed.

Abstract: A processor may include a register to store a bus-lock-disable bit and an execution unit to execute instructions. The execution unit may receive an instruction that includes a memory access request. The execution may further determine that the memory access request requires acquiring a bus lock, and, responsive to detecting that the bus-lock-disable bit indicates that bus locks are disabled, signal a fault to an operating system.