Abstract: A processor includes an execution unit and a processing logic operatively coupled to the execution unit, the processing logic to: enter a first execution state and transition to a second execution state responsive to executing a control transfer instruction. Responsive to executing a target instruction of the control transfer instruction, the processing logic further transitions to the first execution state responsive to the target instruction being a control transfer termination instruction of a mode identical to a mode of the processing logic following the execution of the control transfer instruction; and raises an execution exception responsive to the target instruction being a control transfer termination instruction of a mode different than the mode of the processing logic following the execution of the control transfer instruction.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and apparatuses relating to instructions to compartmentalize memory accesses and execution (e.g., non-speculative and speculative) are described.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a processor comprises: a first configuration register to store quality of service (QoS) information for a process address space identifier (PASID) value associated with a first process; and an execution circuit coupled to the first configuration register, where the execution circuit, in response to a first instruction, is to obtain command data from a first location identified in a source operand of the first instruction, insert the QoS information and the PASID value into the command data, and send a request comprising the command data to a device coupled to the processor, to enable the device to use the QoS information of a plurality of requests to manage sharing between a plurality of processes. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to providing a secure address translation service. An embodiment of a system includes a memory for storage of data, an Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) coupled to the memory via a host-to-device link the IOMMU to perform operations, comprising receiving an address translation request from a remote device via a host-to-device link, wherein the address translation request comprises a virtual address (VA), determining a physical address (PA) associated with the virtual address (VA), generating an encrypted physical address (EPA) using at least the physical address (PA) and a cryptographic key, and sending the encrypted physical address (EPA) to the remote device via the host-to-device link.

Abstract: A processor comprises a core, a cache, and a ZCM manager in communication with the core and the cache. In response to an access request from a first software component, wherein the access request involves a memory address within a cache line, the ZCM manager is to (a) compare an OTAG associated with the memory address against a first ITAG for the first software component, (b) if the OTAG matches the first ITAG, complete the access request, and (c) if the OTAG does not match the first ITAG, abort the access request. Also, in response to a send request from the first software component, the ZCM manager is to change the OTAG associated with the memory address to match a second ITAG for a second software component. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Embodiments described herein may include apparatus, systems, techniques, or processes that are directed to PCIe Address Translation Service (ATS) to allow devices to have a DevTLB that caches address translation (per page) information in conjunction with a Device ProcessInfoCache (DevPIC) that will store process specific information. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A processor includes a processor core. A register of the core is to store: a bit range for a number of address bits of physical memory addresses used for key identifiers (IDs), and a first key ID to identify a boundary between non-restricted key IDs and restricted key IDs of the key identifiers. A memory controller is to: determine, via access to bit range and the first key ID in the register, a key ID range of the restricted key IDs within the physical memory addresses; access a processor state that a first logical processor of the processor core executes in an untrusted domain mode; receive a memory transaction, from the first logical processor, including an address associated with a second key ID; and generate a fault in response to a determination that the second key ID is within a key ID range of the restricted key IDs.

Abstract: Secure memory repartitioning technologies are described. Embodiments of the disclosure may include a processing device including a processor core and a memory controller coupled between the processor core and a memory device. The memory device includes a memory range including a section of convertible pages that are convertible to secure pages or non-secure pages. The processor core is to receive a non-secure access request to a page in the memory device, responsive to a determination, based on one or more secure state bits in one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a secure page, insert an abort page address into a translation lookaside buffer, and responsive to a determination, based on the one or more secure state bits in the one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a non-secure page, insert the page into the translation lookaside buffer.

Abstract: A processor implementing techniques for processor extensions to protect stacks during ring transitions is provided. In one embodiment, the processor includes a plurality of registers and a processor core, operatively coupled to the plurality of registers. The plurality of registers is used to store data used in privilege level transitions. Each register of the plurality of registers is associated with a privilege level. An indicator to change a first privilege level of a currently active application to a second privilege level is received. In view of the second privilege level, a shadow stack pointer (SSP) stored in a register of the plurality of registers is selected. The register is associated with the second privilege level. By using the SSP, a shadow stack for use by the processor at the second privilege level is identified.

Abstract: Implementations describe a computing system that implements a plurality of virtual machines inside a trust domain (TD), enabled via a secure arbitration mode (SEAM) of the processor. A processor includes one or more registers to store a SEAM range of memory, a TD key identifier of a TD private encryption key. The processor is capable of initializing a trust domain resource manager (TDRM) to manage the TD, and a virtual machine monitor within the TD to manage the plurality of virtual machines therein. The processor is further capable of exclusively associating a plurality of memory pages with the TD, wherein the plurality of memory pages associated with the TD is encrypted with a TD private encryption key inaccessible to the TDRM. The processor is further capable of using the SEAM range of memory, inaccessible to the TDRM, to provide isolation between the TDRM and the plurality of virtual machines.

Abstract: Implementations of the disclosure provide a processing device comprising an address translation circuit to intercept a work request from an I/O device. The work request comprises a first ASID to map to a work queue. A second ASID of a host is allocated for the first ASID based on the work queue. The second ASID is allocated to at least one of: an ASID register for a dedicated work queue (DWQ) or an ASID translation table for a shared work queue (SWQ). Responsive to receiving a work submission from the SVM client to the I/O device, the first ASID of the application container is translated to the second ASID of the host machine for submission to the I/O device using at least one of: the ASID register for the DWQ or the ASID translation table for the SWQ based on the work queue associated with the I/O device.

Abstract: Methods and apparatuses relating to switching of a shadow stack pointer are described. In one embodiment, a hardware processor includes a hardware decode unit to decode an instruction, and a hardware execution unit to execute the instruction to: pop a token for a thread from a shadow stack, wherein the token includes a shadow stack pointer for the thread with at least one least significant bit (LSB) of the shadow stack pointer overwritten with a bit value of an operating mode of the hardware processor for the thread, remove the bit value in the at least one LSB from the token to generate the shadow stack pointer, and set a current shadow stack pointer to the shadow stack pointer from the token when the operating mode from the token matches a current operating mode of the hardware processor.

Abstract: A processor implementing techniques for processor extensions to protect stacks during ring transitions is provided. In one embodiment, the processor includes a plurality of registers and a processor core, operatively coupled to the plurality of registers. The plurality of registers is used to store data used in privilege level transitions. Each register of the plurality of registers is associated with a privilege level. An indicator to change a first privilege level of a currently active application to a second privilege level is received. In view of the second privilege level, a shadow stack pointer (SSP) stored in a register of the plurality of registers is selected. The register is associated with the second privilege level. By using the SSP, a shadow stack for use by the processor at the second privilege level is identified.

Abstract: A system on a chip (SoC) includes memory, a processor coupled to the memory, and link protection circuitry coupled to the memory and the processor. The link protection circuitry includes an SoC encryption engine to receive first data from the memory and a first key, generate, by an SoC encryption counter of the SoC encryption engine, an SoC encryption counter value, encrypt the first data using the SoC encryption counter value and the first key to generate first encrypted data, and cause the first encrypted data to be transmitted to a device including a device decryption counter synchronized with the SoC encryption counter.

Abstract: A protected link between a first computing device and a second computing device is set up, wherein communication over the protected link is to comply with a communication protocol that allows packets to be reordered during transit. A plurality of packets are generated according to a packet format that ensures the plurality of packets will not be reordered during transmission over the protected link, the plurality of packets comprising a first packet and a second packet. Data of the plurality of packets are encrypted for transmission over the protected link, wherein data of the first packet is encrypted based on the cryptographic key and a first value of a counter and data of the second packet is encrypted based on the cryptographic key and a second value of the counter.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and apparatuses relating to circuitry to implement individually revocable capabilities for enforcing temporal memory safety are described. In one embodiment, a hardware processor comprises an execution unit to execute an instruction to request access to a block of memory through a pointer to the block of memory, and a memory controller circuit to allow access to the block of memory when an allocated object tag in the pointer is validated with an allocated object tag in an entry of a capability table in memory that is indexed by an index value in the pointer, wherein the memory controller circuit is to clear the allocated object tag in the capability table when a corresponding object is deallocated.

Abstract: A processor may include a register to store a bus-lock-disable bit and an execution unit to execute instructions. The execution unit may receive an instruction that includes a memory access request. The execution may further determine that the memory access request requires acquiring a bus lock, and, responsive to detecting that the bus-lock-disable bit indicates that bus locks are disabled, signal a fault to an operating system.

Abstract: This disclosure is directed to a system for address mapping and translation protection. In one embodiment, processing circuitry may include a virtual machine manager (VMM) to control specific guest linear address (GLA) translations. Control may be implemented in a performance sensitive and secure manner, and may be capable of improving performance for critical linear address page walks over legacy operation by removing some or all of the cost of page walking extended page tables (EPTs) for critical mappings. Alone or in combination with the above, certain portions of a page table structure may be selectively made immutable by a VMM or early boot process using a sub-page policy (SPP). For example, SPP may enable non-volatile kernel and/or user space code and data virtual-to-physical memory mappings to be made immutable (e.g., non-writable) while allowing for modifications to non-protected portions of the OS paging structures and particularly the user space.

Abstract: Securing communications over a compute express link (CXL) is performed by receiving allocation of memory in a memory device and a key identifier (ID) to a trusted execution environment virtual machine (TEE VM); configuring a random key for the key ID by sending a random key configuration request to instruct a device security manager (DSM) of the memory device to configure a memory encryption engine (MEE) of the memory device with the random key and the memory allocation; initializing the allocated memory using the random key; and enabling secure access by the TEE VM to the allocated memory over the CXL by encrypting data transfers from the TEE VM to the memory device using the random key or decrypting data transfers from the memory device to the TEE VM using the random key.