Abstract: A memory device can include a memory, and an interface to receive a memory command sequence. A message authentication code MAC is provided with the command sequence. Control circuits on the device include a command decoder to decode a received command sequence and to execute an identified memory operation. A message authentication engine includes logic to compute a value of a message authentication code to be matched with the received message authentication code based on the received command sequence and a stored key. The device can store a plurality of keys associated with one or more memory zones in the memory. Logic on the device prevents completion of the memory operation identified by the command sequence if the value computed does not match the received message authentication code.

Abstract: A device which can be implemented on a single packaged integrated circuit or a multichip module comprises a plurality of non-volatile memory cells, and logic to use a physical unclonable function to produce a key and to store the key in a set of non-volatile memory cells in the plurality of non-volatile memory cells. The physical unclonable function can use entropy derived from non-volatile memory cells in the plurality of non-volatile memory cells to produce a key. Logic is described to disable changes to data in the set of non-volatile memory cells, and thereby freeze the key after it is stored in the set.

Abstract: A multi-chip package, a controlling method of the multi-chip package and a security chip are provided. The multi-chip package includes a memory chip and a security chip. The security chip is coupled between the memory chip and a host. The security chip includes a processing circuit. The processing circuit is for enabling a security path to input an input-output signal into the processing circuit for executing a security procedure and accessing the memory chip, if a command is received by the processing circuit and the command includes a security requirement.

Abstract: A memory device, including a secure command decoder implementing security logic configured to detect commands carrying an encrypted immediate data payload from a requesting host, authenticate the host as source of the command, decode the immediate data and perform a memory access command called for by a command portion of the decrypted immediate data upon the storage cells of the memory device using the non-command portion of the decrypted immediate data, as well as to encrypt any result from executing the command portion prior to returning the result to the requesting host, and an input/output interface for I/O data units supporting multiple hosts.

Abstract: A memory device can comprise a memory, and an interface to receive a memory command sequence. A message authentication code MAC is provided with the command sequence. Control circuits on the device include a command decoder to decode a received a command sequence and to execute an identified memory operation. A message authentication engine includes logic to compute a value of a message authentication code to be matched with the received message authentication code based on the received command sequence and a stored key. The device can store a plurality of keys associated with one or more memory zones in the memory. Logic on the device prevents completion of the memory operation identified by the command sequence if the value computed does not match the received message authentication code.

Abstract: A device which can be implemented on a single packaged integrated circuit or a multichip module comprises a plurality of non-volatile memory cells, and logic to use a physical unclonable function to produce a key and to store the key in a set of non-volatile memory cells in the plurality of non-volatile memory cells. The physical unclonable function can use entropy derived from non-volatile memory cells in the plurality of non-volatile memory cells to produce a key. Logic is described to disable changes to data in the set of non-volatile memory cells, and thereby freeze the key after it is stored in the set.

Abstract: A memory system has a plurality of memory devices coupled with a hub in discrete and shared port arrangements. A plurality of bus lines connect the plurality of memory devices to the hub, including a first subset of bus lines connected in a point-to-point configuration between the hub and a particular memory device, and a second subset of bus lines connected to all the memory devices in the plurality of memory devices including the particular memory device. Bus operation logic is configured to use the first subset of bus lines in a first operation accessing the particular memory device while simultaneously using the second subset of bus lines in a second operation accessing a different selected memory device of the plurality of memory devices.

Abstract: A memory device comprises a memory array with I/O path and security circuitry coupled to the I/O path of the memory array. The memory device comprises control circuitry, responsive to configuration data, to invoke the security circuitry. The memory device comprises a configuration store, storing the configuration data accessible by the control circuitry to specify location and size of a security memory region in the memory array. Responsive to an external command and the configuration data, the control circuitry can be configured to invoke the security circuitry on an operation specified in the external command in response to accesses into the security memory region, or to not invoke the security circuitry in response to accesses to outside the security memory region.

Abstract: A memory device comprises a memory array with I/O path and security circuitry coupled to the I/O path of the memory array. The memory device comprises control circuitry, responsive to configuration data, to invoke the security circuitry. The memory device comprises a configuration store, storing the configuration data accessible by the control circuitry to specify location and size of a security memory region in the memory array. Responsive to an external command and the configuration data, the control circuitry can be configured to invoke the security circuitry on an operation specified in the external command in response to accesses into the security memory region, or to not invoke the security circuitry in response to accesses to outside the security memory region.

Abstract: A memory chip comprises a first memory controller, a first data storage zone, a security unit and an address configuration unit. The first data storage zone is coupled to the first memory controller, and represented by a first physical address range. The security unit is coupled to the first memory controller. The address configuration unit is coupled to the first memory controller. The memory chip is configured to be coupled between a host controller and another memory chip. The another memory chip comprises a second data storage zone represented by a second physical address range. The address configuration unit records one or more relationships of a logical address range corresponding to the first physical address range and the second physical address range. The security unit is configured to encrypt and decrypt data in the first data storage zone and the second data storage zone.

Abstract: A security memory device coupled to a host includes: a normal region for storing normal data; a security region for storing security data; and a memory controller, coupled to the normal region and to the security region. In response to a first command which is issued from the host and indicates the security memory device to enter a security field, the memory controller allows the host to access the security region. In the security field, the memory controller performs at least one security command set on the security region. In response to a second command which is issued from the host and indicates the security memory device to exit the security field, the memory controller prohibits the host from accessing the security region.

Abstract: A system and method use a physical unclonable function in a PUF circuit on an integrated circuit to generate a security key, and stabilize the security key by storage in a set of nonvolatile memory cells. The stabilized security key is moved from the set of nonvolatile memory cells to a cache memory, and utilized as stored in the cache memory in a security protocol. Also, data transfer from the PUF circuit to the set of nonvolatile memory cells can be disabled after using the PUF circuit to produce the security key, at a safe time, such as after the security key has been moved from the set of nonvolatile memory cells to the cache memory.

Abstract: A system including a host and a guest device, where the guest device can be implemented on a single packaged integrated circuit or a multichip circuit and have logic to use a physical unclonable function to produce a security key. The device can include logic on the guest to provide the PUF key to the host in a secure manner. The physical unclonable function can use entropy derived from non-volatile memory cells to produce the initial key. Logic is described to disable changes to PUF data, and thereby freeze the key after it is stored in the set.

Abstract: A multi-chip package, a controlling method of the multi-chip package and a security chip are provided. The multi-chip package includes a memory chip and a security chip. The security chip is coupled between the memory chip and a host. The security chip includes a processing circuit. The processing circuit is for enabling a security path to input an input-output signal into the processing circuit for executing a security procedure and accessing the memory chip, if a command is received by the processing circuit and the command includes a security requirement.

Abstract: A nested wrap-around technology includes an address counter and associated logic for generating addresses to perform a nested wrap-around access operation. The nested wrap-around access operation may be a read or a write operation. A wrap-around section length and a wrap-around count define a wrap-around block. A wrap starting address, initially set to a supplied start address, is offset from a lower boundary of a wrap-around section. Access starts at a wrap starting address and proceeds in a wrap-around manner within a wrap-around section. After access of the address immediately preceding the wrap starting address, the wrap starting address is incremented by the wrap-around section length, or, if the wrap-around section is the last one in the wrap-around block, the wrap starting address is set to the lower boundary of the wrap-around block plus the offset. Access continues until a termination event.

Abstract: A nested wrap-around technology includes an address counter and associated logic for generating addresses to perform a nested wrap-around access operation. The nested wrap-around access operation may be a read or a write operation. A wrap-around section length and a wrap-around count define a wrap-around block. A wrap starting address, initially set to a supplied start address, is offset from a lower boundary of a wrap-around section. Access starts at a wrap starting address and proceeds in a wrap-around manner within a wrap-around section. After access of the address immediately preceding the wrap starting address, the wrap starting address is incremented by the wrap-around section length, or, if the wrap-around section is the last one in the wrap-around block, the wrap starting address is set to the lower boundary of the wrap-around block plus the offset. Access continues until a termination event.

Abstract: A system including a host and a guest device, where the guest device can be implemented on a single packaged integrated circuit or a multichip circuit and have logic to use a physical unclonable function to produce a security key. The device can include logic on the guest to provide the PUF key to the host in a secure manner. The physical unclonable function can use entropy derived from non-volatile memory cells to produce the initial key. Logic is described to disable changes to PUF data, and thereby freeze the key after it is stored in the set.

Abstract: A device which can be implemented on a single packaged integrated circuit or a multichip module comprises a plurality of non-volatile memory cells, and logic to use a physical unclonable function to produce a key and to store the key in a set of non-volatile memory cells in the plurality of non-volatile memory cells. The physical unclonable function can use entropy derived from non-volatile memory cells in the plurality of non-volatile memory cells to produce a key. Logic is described to disable changes to data in the set of non-volatile memory cells, and thereby freeze the key after it is stored in the set.

Abstract: A nested wrap-around technology includes an address counter and associated logic for generating addresses to perform a nested wrap-around access operation. The nested wrap-around access operation may be a read or a write operation. A wrap-around section length and a wrap-around count define a wrap-around block. A wrap starting address, initially set to a supplied start address, is offset from a lower boundary of a wrap-around section. Access starts at a wrap starting address and proceeds in a wrap-around manner within a wrap-around section. After access of the address immediately preceding the wrap starting address, the wrap starting address is incremented by the wrap-around section length, or, if the wrap-around section is the last one in the wrap-around block, the wrap starting address is set to the lower boundary of the wrap-around block plus the offset. Access continues until a termination event.

Abstract: An erasing method of a memory device is provided. The memory device includes a memory controller and a memory array having a first memory region and a second memory region. The first memory region and the second memory region share the same well. The erasing method comprising steps of: erasing the first memory region; and selectively programming the second memory region according to an error correction code algorithm.