Abstract: During a test for integrated circuit aging effects, contents of a first set of flip flop circuits are transferred to a second set of flip flop circuits. A first test value is applied to inputs of a combinatorial logic circuit and outputs from the combinatorial logic circuitry are provided to inputs of the first set of flip flop circuits. The combinatorial logic circuitry is reversible and conservative. The outputs from the first flip flop circuits are compared to the first test value to determine if there is a match. A second test value is applied to the inputs of the combinatorial logic circuitry and the outputs from the combinatorial logic circuitry are provided to inputs of the first set of flip flop circuits. The outputs from the first flip flop circuits are compared to the second test value to determine if there is a match, and when the test mode finishes, contents of the second set of flip flop circuits are transferred to the first set of flip flop circuits.

Abstract: One specific example involves an integrated circuit that has application logic circuitry which includes flip-flop circuits susceptible to degradations of setup and hold times relative to specified minimum setup and hold times for signals to be processed by the respective flip-flop circuits. In a method carried out by the integrated circuit, timing-based logic states of the flip-flop circuits are controlled, based on at least one transition-scan pattern processed by the flip-flop circuits as part of the application logic circuitry; and respective logic states are set for those flip-flops, which due to degradations of the actual setup and hold times do not satisfy anymore the originally specified minimum setup and hold times.

Abstract: A method and device for detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit (IC) device is provided. The method includes generating a plurality of test patterns on the IC. A scan test circuit and the plurality of test patterns are used to test don't care bits of a function under test on the integrated circuit. Scan out data from the scan test circuit is provided in response to the plurality of test patterns. The scan out data is stored in a memory on the integrated circuit. The scan out data is monitored over a predetermined time period. If it is determined that a characteristic of the scan out data has changed within the predetermined time period, an indication that a malicious circuit has been detected is output. The device includes circuitry for performing the method in the field.

Abstract: A method for controlling access to a chip includes obtaining first values of a first physically unclonable function of the chip, obtaining second values that correspond to at least one challenge word, performing a simulation based on the first values and the second values, and generating an authentication result for the chip based on results of the simulation. The simulation may generate responses to logical operations corresponding to combinatorial logic in the chip, and the logical operations may be performed based on a predetermined sequence of the first values and the second values. The chip may be authenticated based on a match between the responses generated by the simulation and a second physically unclonable function of the chip.

Abstract: According to certain examples, a circuit-based wireless communications system provides secure access to a vehicle by way of certain circuitry configure to compare a first RF background observed for a vehicle-located RF receiver that is part of a vehicle-located circuit secured to a vehicle, with a second RF background observed for a wireless-communications vehicle-access circuit that includes another RF receiver. In response, a distance metric is generated to indicate a degree of similarity between the first RF background and the second RF background, and based on whether this metric satisfies a threshold, access to the vehicle may be granted via the wireless-communications vehicle-access circuit.

Abstract: A method of testing a semiconductor device. An apparatus comprising a semiconductor device and a test apparatus. The semiconductor device includes an integrated circuit and a plurality of external radiating elements at a surface of the device, the radiating elements include transmit elements and receive elements. The test apparatus includes a surface for placing against the surface of the device. The test apparatus also includes at least one waveguide, which extends through the test apparatus for routing electromagnetic radiation transmitted by one of the transmit elements of the device to one of the receive elements of the device. Each waveguide comprises a plurality of waveguide openings for coupling electromagnetically to corresponding radiating elements of the plurality of radiating elements located at the surface of the device. A spacing between the waveguide openings of each waveguide is larger than, or smaller than a spacing between the corresponding radiating elements.

Abstract: A tie cell includes a first flip-flop having a physically unclonable function (PUF), a second flip-flop that generates a PUF key value, and logic that logically combines the PUF value and the PUF key value to generate an output signal having a constant logical value. The PUF value is based on a power-up value stored in the first flip-flop, which power-up value is generated based on physical and/or electrical characteristics produced from a manufacturing process. The output value is generated to tie digital logic to the constant logical value.

Abstract: A test apparatus and method for testing a semiconductor device. The semiconductor device includes an integrated circuit and a plurality of external radiating elements located at a surface of the device. The external radiating elements include at least one transmit element and receive element. The test apparatus includes a plunger. The plunger includes a dielectric portion having a surface for placing against the surface of the device. The plunger also includes at least one waveguide. Each waveguide extends through the plunger for routing electromagnetic radiation transmitted by one of the transmit elements of the device to one of the receive elements of the device. Each waveguide comprises a plurality of waveguide openings for coupling electromagnetically to corresponding radiating elements of the device. The dielectric portion is configured to provide a matched interface for the electromagnetic coupling of the waveguide openings to the plurality of external radiating elements of the device.

Abstract: A method for triggering and detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit device is provided. A first run of test patterns is provided to logic circuits on the integrated circuit device. Each test pattern of the first run of test patterns includes a plurality of bits, a first portion of the plurality of bits being bits that do not influence a value of a resulting first test output vector, and a second portion of the plurality of bits being bits that will influence the value of the first test output vector. The value of the first test output vector is compared to first expected values. Bit values of the first portion of the plurality of bits for each test pattern of the first run of test patterns are changed to generate a second run of test patterns. The second run of test patterns is provided to the logic circuits on the integrated circuit device. A value of the second run of test patterns is compared to second expected values.

Abstract: A wireless communication device is described that comprises: a receiver configured to receive wireless local area signals located within a closed area; and a processor configured to: process the received wireless local area signals; calculate a standard deviation, STD, of Amplitude Channel State Information, A CSI, of the received wireless local area signals and, in response thereto, generate at least one transmit wireless local area signal based on the calculated A CSI STD values. A transmitter is coupled to the processor and configured to transmit the at least one transmit wireless local area signal within the closed area to disrupt an attacker located adjacent the closed area from determining a location or movement of at least one of: a moving person, the at least one further wireless communication device within the closed area.

Abstract: A method and data processing system is provided for detecting an attack on a physically unclonable function (PUF). In the method, a first list of PUF responses to challenges is produced during production testing of an integrated circuit comprising the PUF. The first list is stored in a memory on the integrated circuit. A second list of PUF responses to the challenges is produced during normal operation of the integrated circuit in the field. The second list is compared to the first list. A difference between entries of the first and second lists computed. If the difference is greater than a threshold difference, then an indication of a hardware trojan is generated. The method may also include monitoring a series of challenges for an indication of a non-random pattern in the series. Detection of a non-random pattern may indicate a modeling attack.

Abstract: A built-in self-test, BIST, radar unit (100) is described. The BIST radar unit (100) comprises: a frequency generation circuit (110) configured to generate a mmW transmit signal; a transmitter circuit comprising: at least one phase shifter (130, 132) configured apply at least one phase shift to the mmW transmit signal; and at least one phase inverter (140, 142) coupled to the at least one phase shifter (130, 132) and configured to invert a phase of the phase shifted mmW transmit signal. A receiver configured to receive and process a received version of the mmW transmit signal.

Abstract: Embodiments combine error correction code (ECC) and transparent memory built-in self-test (TMBIST) for memory fault detection and correction. An ECC encoder receives input data and provides ECC data for data words stored in memory. Input XOR circuits receive the input data and output XOR'ed data as payload data for the data words. Output XOR circuits receive the payload data and output XOR'ed data. An ECC decoder receives the ECC data and the XOR'ed output data and generates error messages. Either test data from a controller running a TMBIST process or application data from a processor executing an application is selected as the input data. Either test address/control signals from the controller or application address/control signals from the processor are selected for memory access. During active operation of the application, memory access is provided to the processor and the controller, and the memory is tested during the active operation.

Abstract: A method for managing operation of a circuit includes activating a trigger engine, receiving signals from a target circuit, and detecting a hardware trojan based on the signals. The trigger engine may generate a stimulus to activate the hardware trojan, and the target circuit may generate the received signals when the stimulus is generated. The trigger engine may be a scan chain which performs a circular scan by shifting bit values through a series of flip-flops including a feedback path. The target circuit may be various types of circuits, including but not limited to a high-speed input/output interface. The hardware trojan may be detected based on bit-error rate information corresponding to the signals output from the target circuit.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided to secure integrated circuit devices that combines a high degree of security with a low overhead, both in area and cost, thereby making it appropriate for smaller, cheaper integrated circuits. A determination is made whether a device die is on a wafer or if the device die is incorporated into a package. Only if the device die is incorporated in a package can the functional logic of device die be activated, and then only if a challenge-response query is satisfied. In some embodiments, a random number generator is used during wafer testing to form a pair of numbers, along with a die identifier, that is unique for each device die. A final test is then performed in which the device die can be activated if the device die is incorporated in a package, and the die identifier—random number pair is authenticated.

Abstract: An example method includes stressing, under different circuit-stress test conditions, a plurality of different types of regional circuits susceptible to time dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB), and in response, monitoring for levels of reliability failure associated with the plurality of different types of regional circuits. The method includes storing a set of stress-test data based on each of the levels of reliability failure, the set of stress-test data being stored within the integrated circuit to indicate reliability-threshold test data specific to the integrated circuit. Within the integrated circuit, an on-chip monitoring circuit indicates operational conditions of suspect reliability associated with dielectric breakdown of at least one of the plurality of different types of regional circuits.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to voltage regulators and more specially voltage regulators including error detection and correction mechanisms. Example embodiments include a voltage regulator comprising: an input arranged to receive a trim signal used to specify a target voltage at an output of the regulator; a comparator arranged to compare a voltage derived from the trim signal to the voltage at the output of the regulator; a filter arranged to filter an output of the comparator; a checksum module comprising first and second portions arranged to calculate first and second checksums respectively from a plurality of states associated with the voltage regulator and to provide an error signal equal to the difference between the first and second checksums; and an adjustment module arranged to receive the error signal and adjust one or more of the plurality of states if the error signal is non-zero.

Abstract: An example apparatus includes a circuit and calibration circuitry. The circuit has complementary input ports to receive input signals including a monotonously rising and/or falling wave reference signal and a voltage-test signal to test at least one direct current (DC) voltage associated with the circuit by comparing the input signals using a first polarity and second polarity associated with the circuit to produce a first output signal and a second output signal. During operation, the circuit manifests an input voltage offset and a signal delay with each comparison of the input signals. The calibration circuitry processes the first and second output signals and, in response, calibrates or sets an adjustment for at least one signal path associated with the circuit in order to account for the input offset voltage and signal delay during normal operation of the circuit.

Abstract: A test system is provided. The test system includes a printed circuit board (PCB) and a plurality of integrated circuits (ICs) mounted on the PCB. A first IC of the plurality includes a first test circuit having a first test access port (TAP) controller. A second IC of the plurality includes a second test circuit having a second TAP controller and an embedded tester having a test data output coupled to a test data input of the first TAP controller by way of a link circuit. The embedded tester is configured to provide test control signals to the first TAP controller and the second TAP controller.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided for detecting errors and parametric deviations in phase-locked loops (PLLs) by measuring the effectiveness of a PLL in recovering from an introduced delay in phase at a phase comparator of the PLL. Embodiments measure a proxy for the area under a phase difference recovery curve of the PLL. If the phase difference recovery is out of predefined thresholds for the PLL, then an error in the PLL is flagged or responded to. In some embodiments, the PLL is automatically re-trimmed to bring the PLL back within the predefined thresholds.