Abstract: An example analog-test-bus (ATB) apparatus includes a plurality of comparator circuits, each having an output port, and a pair of input ports of opposing polarity including an inverting port and a non-inverting port, a plurality of circuit nodes to be selectively connected to the input ports of a first polarity, and at least one digital-to-analog converter (DAC) to drive the input ports of the plurality of comparator circuits. The apparatus further includes data storage and logic circuitry that accounts for inaccuracies attributable to the plurality of comparator circuits by providing, for each comparator circuit, a set of calibration data indicative of the inaccuracies for adjusting comparison operations performed by the plurality of comparator circuits.

Abstract: A method is provided for authenticating a transceiver in a keyless entry system for a vehicle. The method uses a collision avoidance radar system on the vehicle for authenticating a key fob radar transceiver. A lower power radar signal is transmitted from the vehicle. The lower power radar signal is transmitted below an ambient noise level to make the radar signal difficult for an attacker to detect. The key fob transceiver is then authenticated as being a legitimate transceiver for accessing the vehicle using the low power radar signal. A distance bounding scheme may be used to determine if the key fob is within a predetermined distance. Challenge/response communications may be used to authenticate that the key fob is the legitimate key fob.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to apparatuses and methods involving communication between a first circuit and a second circuit over a wired-data bus. An example apparatus includes an integrated circuit (IC) chip within one of the first and second circuits and a logic circuit. The IC has a first data-communication port and a second data-communication for connection to respective first and second conductors of the wired-data bus. The logic circuit communicates a code multi-bit word out of a set of code multi-bit words over the wired-data bus by using signal transitions communicated on the first and second conductors. The code multi-bit word conveys clocked data bits indicated by the signal transitions, and information unique relative to other ones of the set of code multi-bit words by a known sequential pattern of the signal transitions defined relative to timing associated with the clocked data bits.

Abstract: An example method includes stressing, under different circuit-stress test conditions, a plurality of different types of regional circuits susceptible to time dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB), and in response, monitoring for levels of reliability failure associated with the plurality of different types of regional circuits. The method includes storing a set of stress-test data based on each of the levels of reliability failure, the set of stress-test data being stored within the integrated circuit to indicate reliability-threshold test data specific to the integrated circuit. Within the integrated circuit, an on-chip monitoring circuit indicates operational conditions of suspect reliability associated with dielectric breakdown of at least one of the plurality of different types of regional circuits.

Abstract: An example apparatus includes application circuit that carries out a specific set of actions on an input data vector, and a decoding circuit. The application circuit includes: a first diversification logic circuit that processes data corresponding to the input data vector and in response, generates a coded first output data vector; and a second diversification logic circuit that processes the data corresponding to the input data vector and in response, generate a coded second output data vector, the coded second output data vector being uniquely coded relative to the coded first output data vector. The decoding circuit assesses the coded first output data vector relative to the coded second output data vector and, in response, generates output data indicative of a likelihood of a design weakness in the application circuit.

Abstract: A method is provided for detecting an attack on a keyless entry system for a vehicle. The method includes receiving a wireless transmission by the keyless entry system. The wireless transmission is filtered in a first filter to produce a filtered wireless transmission. The wireless transmission is filtered in a second filter to produce a reference filtered wireless transmission. A frequency band of the filtered wireless transmission is compared to a frequency band of the reference filtered wireless transmission. Based on the comparison, it is determined if the wireless transmission is from a key fob that complies with the specification of the wireless transmission. In another embodiment, a wireless receiver is provided for performing the method.

Abstract: A method includes generating a target map indicative of objects around the vehicle using sensor data from sensor circuitry of the vehicle, the sensor circuitry including at least one radar sensor; and determining, by processing circuitry, if the vehicle is being towed away. Determining if the vehicle is being towed away can include comparing the target map to a previously obtained target map, determining if the vehicle is moving based on the comparison, and in response to determining the vehicle is moving, outputting an alarm message indicative of the vehicle being towed away.

Abstract: A method is provided for authenticating a transceiver in a keyless entry system for a vehicle. The method uses a collision avoidance radar system on the vehicle for authenticating a key fob radar transceiver. A lower power radar signal is transmitted from the vehicle. The lower power radar signal is transmitted below an ambient noise level to make the radar signal difficult for an attacker to detect. The key fob transceiver is then authenticated as being a legitimate transceiver for accessing the vehicle using the low power radar signal. A distance bounding scheme may be used to determine if the key fob is within a predetermined distance. Challenge/response communications may be used to authenticate that the key fob is the legitimate key fob.

Abstract: An apparatus embodiment includes a voltage regulator circuit that provides a regulated voltage supply signal, logic state circuitry, test control circuitry, and a supply-signal monitoring circuit. The logic state circuitry includes logic modules that are reconfigured between application controlled self-test modes in which data is shifted through the logic module and while being powered from the regulated voltage supply signal. The test control circuitry operates the controlled self-test mode by causing a predetermined set of the data to shift through the logic modules and that causes the logic state circuitry to load the voltage regulator circuit by stressing the voltage regulator circuit. The supply-signal monitoring circuit monitors a quality parameter of the regulated voltage supply signal and provides an indication of characteristics of the regulated voltage supply signal which bear on a likelihood that the voltage regulator circuit is associated with defective circuitry.

Abstract: Certain aspects of the disclosure are directed to methods and apparatuses of intrusion detection for integrated circuits. An example apparatus can include a wired communications bus configured and arranged to carry data and a plurality of integrated circuits. The plurality of integrated circuits can include a first integrated circuit configured and arranged to operate in a scan mode during which the first integrated circuit performs a scan test to detect one or more faults in circuitry of the plurality of integrated circuits. The plurality of integrated circuits can further include a second integrated circuit configured and arranged to operate in a mission mode and supervise data traffic by monitoring communications including data patterns and accesses on the wired communications bus. In response to identifying a suspected illegitimate access, the second integrated circuit can perform a security action to mitigate a suspect illegitimate action in the plurality of integrated circuits.

Abstract: A dynamic comparator includes two sets of input transistors of opposite conductivity types, where a control electrode of one transistor of each set is coupled to a first input of the comparator and a control input of a second transistor of each set is coupled to a second input of the comparator. The comparator includes bypass transistors for pulling current electrodes of either the first set or second set of input transistors to a power supply terminal depending which input voltage is higher as determined by the output.

Abstract: A method for detecting defeat devices in an engine control unit (ECU) includes storing with a key-data collection unit, a first key-data determined during an environmental test of a vehicle. The key-data collection unit stores a second key-data determined before the environmental test. Wherein, one of the first key-data is determined by the ECU modified by a characteristic only present before the environmental test and the second key-data is determined by the ECU modified by a characteristic only present during the environmental test. An environmental testing device compares the first key-data with the second key-data to detect an anomaly, wherein the anomaly indicates the presence of the defeat device in the ECU.

Abstract: A method for triggering and detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit device is provided. A first run of test patterns is provided to logic circuits on the integrated circuit device. Each test pattern of the first run of test patterns includes a plurality of bits, a first portion of the plurality of bits being bits that do not influence a value of a resulting first test output vector, and a second portion of the plurality of bits being bits that will influence the value of the first test output vector. The value of the first test output vector is compared to first expected values. Bit values of the first portion of the plurality of bits for each test pattern of the first run of test patterns are changed to generate a second run of test patterns. The second run of test patterns is provided to the logic circuits on the integrated circuit device. A value of the second run of test patterns is compared to second expected values.

Abstract: A method and device for detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit (IC) device is provided. The method includes generating a plurality of test patterns on the IC. A scan test circuit and the plurality of test patterns are used to test don't care bits of a function under test on the integrated circuit. Scan out data from the scan test circuit is provided in response to the plurality of test patterns. The scan out data is stored in a memory on the integrated circuit. The scan out data is monitored over a predetermined time period. If it is determined that a characteristic of the scan out data has changed within the predetermined time period, an indication that a malicious circuit has been detected is output. The device includes circuitry for performing the method in the field.

Abstract: A method embodiment includes combining a control signal of a voltage regulator circuit of an apparatus with pseudo-random noise, and using the control signal to provide an output voltage signal as attenuated by a power supply rejection ratio (PSRR) of an analog mixed-signal (AMS) circuit of the apparatus. The method further includes self-testing the AMS circuit by cross-correlating a signal indicative of the output voltage signal from the AMS circuit with the pseudo-random noise and, in response, assessing the results of the cross-correlation relative to a known threshold indicative of a performance level of the AMS circuit.

Abstract: An apparatus includes signal control circuitry, a phase-locked loop (PLL), and a correlation circuit. The signal control circuitry provides a reference clock signal carrying pseudo-random phase noise and as derived from an application clock signal and pseudo-random noise. The PLL, responsive to the reference clock signal carrying the pseudo-random phase noise, provides an output signal that is related to the phase of the reference clock signal. The correlation circuit self-tests the PLL by cross-correlating a signal corresponding to the output signal from the phase detector with the pseudo-random noise and, in response, by assessing results of the cross-correlation relative to a known threshold indicative of a performance level of the PLL.

Abstract: A radar unit (100, 300) is described that comprises: a frequency generation circuit (103, 106, 303, 306) configured to generate a millimetre wave, mmW, frequency modulated continuous wave, FMCW, transmit signal comprising a plurality of chirps; a transmitter circuit (108, 102, 308, 302) configured to transmit the generated mmW FMCW transmit signal: a receiver circuit (104, 110, 304, 310) configured to receive an echo of the mmW FMCW transmit signal; and a built-in self-test, BIST, circuit (140, 340) coupled to the receiver circuit (104, 110, 304, 310) and configured to process the echo of the mmW FMCW transmit signal.

Abstract: An apparatus comprising: a functional circuit comprising one or more circuit components configured to perform a function based on one or more first input signals; at least one failure-prediction circuit for use in predicting failure of the functional circuit, the failure-prediction circuit comprising a replica of the functional circuit in terms of constituent circuit components; wherein the failure-prediction circuit is configured to be more susceptible to failure than said functional circuit, wherein the apparatus is configured to provide a prediction of failure of the functional circuit based on a determination of failure of the failure-prediction circuit.

Abstract: A built-in self-test, BIST, radar unit (100) is described. The BIST radar unit (100) comprises: a frequency generation circuit (110) configured to generate a mmW transmit signal; a transmitter circuit comprising: at least one phase shifter (130, 132) configured apply at least one phase shift to the mmW transmit signal; and at least one phase inverter (140, 142) coupled to the at least one phase shifter (130, 132) and configured to invert a phase of the phase shifted mmW transmit signal. A receiver configured to receive and process a received version of the mmW transmit signal.

Abstract: Embodiments are provided for a radar device and a method for operating a radar device, the radar device having a transmitter and a receiver, the method including: generating a noise signal; mixing the noise signal with a transmitter output radio frequency (RF) signal to produce an intermediate signal, wherein the transmitter output RF signal is a version of a local oscillator (LO) signal having linearly increasing frequency; attenuating the intermediate signal to produce a test signal; adding the test signal to a receiver input RF signal to produce a combined receiver input RF signal; downmixing an amplified version of the combined receiver input RF signal with the LO signal to produce a combined low frequency signal; and correlating the combined low frequency signal with the noise signal to produce an error detection signal.