Abstract: Pi and P+ have stored a+?{a0, a1, a2} and b+?{b0, b1, b2} therein, and Pi and P? have stored a??A? and b??B? therein. Here, P+?P(i+1)mod 3, P?=P(i?1)mod 3, and a and b are arbitrary values and satisfy a=a0+a1+a2 and b=b0+b1+b2, where A? is a complement of a+ in {a0, a1, a2} and B? is a complement of b+ in {b0, b1, b2}. Pi and P+ share r+, Pi and P? share r?, and Pi calculates c+=(a++a?)(b++b?)?a?b?+r+?r?. Pi sends c+ to P+.

Abstract: A share generating device obtains N seeds s0, . . . , sN?1, obtains a function value y=g(x, e) ? Fm of plaintext x ? Fm and a function value e, and obtains information containing a member yi and N?1 seeds sd, where d ? {0, . . . , N?1} and d?i, as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi. It is to be noted that the function value y is expressed by members y0 ? Fm(0), . . . , yN?1 ? Fm(N?1) which satisfy m=m(0)+ . . . +m(N?1).

Abstract: A share generating device obtains N seeds s0, . . . , sN?1, obtains a function value y=g(x, e)?Fm of plaintext x?Fm and a function value e, and obtains information containing a member yi and N?1 seeds sd, where d?{0, . . . , N?1} and d?i, as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi. It is to be noted that the function value y is expressed by members y0?Fm(0), . . . , yN?1?Fm(N?1), which satisfy m=m(0)+ . . . +m(N?1).

Abstract: An extraction unit (21) treats two or more consecutive frames of a plurality of frames constituting video data as a time-window frame, and extracts a plurality of time-window frames from the video data so as to cause at least one frame to be overlappingly included in adjacent time-window frames. A tracking unit (22) treats each time-window frame as a target time-window frame, and tracks target objects in the target time-window frame to generate a tracking result. An integration unit (23) integrates tracking results generated in individual time-window frames, based on a frame overlappingly included in more than one time-window frame, to generate an integration result.

Abstract: A technique for performing secure computation of a sigmoid function with high speed and precision is provided. A secret sigmoid function calculation system is a system, in which g(x) is assumed to be a secure computable function, which calculates, from a share [[x]] of an input value x, a share [[??(x)]] of a value of a sigmoid function for the input value x, and includes: a first comparing means that generates a first comparison result [[c]]=less_than([[x]], t1); a second comparing means that generates a second comparison result [[d]]=greater_than([[x]], t0); a first logical computation means that generates a first logical computation result [[e]]=not([[c]]); a second logical computation means that generates a second logical computation result [[k]]=and([[c]], [[d]]) or [[k]]=mul([[c]], [[d]]); and a function value calculating means that calculates the share [[??(x)]]=mul([[k]], [[g(x)]])+[[e]].

Abstract: A graph generation unit (21) generates a tracking graph by setting, as a node, each of a plurality of target objects detected in a plurality of frames constituting video data, and creating an edge between two consecutive frames to connect target objects. A vector calculation unit (22) calculates a velocity vector of a target object detected in a target frame, based on a correspondence between the target object detected in the target frame and a target object detected in a previous frame of the target frame. A cost calculation unit (23) calculates a cost of an edge connecting a target object in the target frame and a target object in a next frame of the target frame in the tracking graph. A correspondence determination unit (24) determines a correspondence between a target object in the target frame and a target object in the next frame, based on the tracking graph and the cost.

Abstract: A secure sigmoid function calculation system is a system in which map? is assumed to be secure batch mapping defined by parameters (a0, . . . , ak-1) representing the domain of definition of a sigmoid function ?(x) and parameters (?(a0), . . . , ?(ak-1)) representing the range of the sigmoid function ?(x) (a0, . . . , ak-1 are real numbers that satisfy a0< . . . <ak-1) and which is configured with three or more secure sigmoid function calculation apparatuses and calculates, from a share [[x?]] of an input vector x?, a share [[y?]] of a value y? of a sigmoid function for the input vector x?, the system including a secure batch mapping calculating means that calculates the share [[y?]] by [[y?]]=map?([[x?]])=([[?(af(0))]], . . . , [[?(af(m-1)]]) (where f(i) (0?i?m?1) is j that makes aj?xi<aj+1 hold).

Abstract: Provided is a technique for performing statistical processing such as processing for obtaining parameters of logistic regression analysis faster than before. A secure statistical processing system includes a cross tabulation table computing device 2 that performs secure computation on a cross tabulation table in which frequencies are in plain texts while keeping each record concealed; and a statistical processing device 3 that performs predetermined statistical processing using the cross tabulation table in which frequencies are in plain texts. The cross tabulation table computing device 2 may include a plurality of secure computation devices 221, . . . , 22N that perform secure computation on a cross tabulation table in which frequencies are fragments subjected to secret sharing while keeping each record concealed, and a management device 21 that restores the fragments to compute the cross tabulation table in which frequencies are in plain texts.

Abstract: A secure joining system is a secure joining system including a plurality of secure computing apparatuses. The plurality of secure computing apparatuses include a first vector joining unit, a first permutation calculation unit, a first vector generation unit, a second vector joining unit, a first permutation application unit, a second vector generation unit, a first inverse permutation application unit, a first vector extraction unit, a second permutation application unit, a third vector generation unit, a second inverse permutation application unit, a second vector extraction unit, a modified second table generation unit, a third permutation application unit, a fourth vector generation unit, a shifting unit, a third inverse permutation application unit, a bit inversion unit, a third vector extraction unit, a modified first table generation unit, a first table joining unit, and a first table formatting unit.

Abstract: At least any one of input keys KA0, KA1, KB?0, and KB?1 is set so that the input keys KA0, KA1, KB?0, and KB?1 which satisfy KA1?KA0=KB?1?KB?0=di are obtained, and an output key Kig(I(A), I(B)) corresponding to an output value gi(I(A), I(B)) is set by using the input keys KA0, KA1, KB?0, and KB?1, where input values of a gate that performs a logical operation are I(A), I(B)?{0, 1}, an output value of the gate is gi(I(A), I(B))?{0, 1}, an input key corresponding to the input value I(A) is KAI(A), and an input key corresponding to the input value I(B) is KB?I(B).

Abstract: A share generating device obtains N seeds s0, . . . , sN?1, obtains a function value y=g(x, e) ? Fm of plaintext x ? Fm and a function value e, and obtains information containing a member yi and N?1 seeds sd, where d ? {0, . . . , N?1} and d?i, as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi. It is to be noted that the function value y is expressed by members y0 ? Fm(0), . . . , yN?1 ? Fm(N?1), which satisfy m=m(0)+ . . . +m(N?1).

Abstract: In a voting system including a vote broadcasting server and a plurality of client terminals, the vote broadcasting server generates a plurality of pieces of vote information that is data in which secret information is shared and transmits the vote information to each client terminal, each client terminal generates voting information by encrypting vote information such that the vote information can be decrypted when predetermined conditions are satisfied and transmits the voting information to the vote broadcasting server, the vote broadcasting server transmits a voting information group composed of voting information received from respective client terminals to the respective client terminals, and each client terminal ascertains a vote result according to the number of pieces of vote information decrypted from the voting information group and executes processing based on the vote result.

Abstract: A concealed-decision-tree computation system includes a user apparatus and 0th to (n?1)-th server apparatuses, where n is a predetermined positive integer. The user apparatus secret-shares data D into n shares [D]j (j=0, . . . , n?1) and sends the n shares [D]j (j=0, . . . , n?1) to the 0th to (n?1)-th server apparatuses, respectively. The 0th to (n?1)-th server apparatuses use the n shares [D]j (j=0, n?1) to perform secret cooperation computation to obtain n shares [out]0, . . . , [out]n-1 of a value “out” corresponding to the data D in a predetermined decision tree and send the n shares [out]0, . . . , [out]n-1 to the user apparatus. The user apparatus uses at least k shares out of the n received shares [out]0, . . . , [out]n-1 to restore the value “out” corresponding to the data D in the predetermined decision tree, where k is a predetermined integer equal to or smaller than n.

Abstract: A secure text having an authentication code is efficiently created. A key generation part 12 generates secure texts ([x], [?], [?]) of “x”, “?” and “?” that are values satisfying x?=?. A secure text generation part 13 generates secure texts [ai] of random values “ai” for i=1, . . . , N. An authentication code generation part 14 generates authentication codes [?(ai)] by multiplying the secure texts [ai] by the secure text [?] for i=1, . . . , N. A verification value generation part 15 generates a secure text [w] of a verification value “w” using the secure texts ([x], [?], [?]), the secure text [ai] and the authentication code [?(ai)]. A verification value determination part 16 determines whether the verification value “w” is equal to zero or not.

Abstract: An efficient share recovery technique for Shamir's secret sharing is provided. n share recovery apparatuses p0, . . . , pn?1 generate a share [r]i of a secretly shared value shared through Shamir's secret sharing, which becomes a random number r when restored. k share recovery apparatuses ?0, . . . , ?k?1 calculate a share [b]i by subtracting the share [r]i from a share [a]i. The share recovery apparatus ?k receives the shares [b]0, . . . , [b]k?1 from the share recovery apparatuses ?0, . . . , ?k?1. The share recovery apparatus ?k recovers shares [b]k, . . . , [b]k+m?1 using the shares [b]0, . . . , [b]k?1. m?1 share recovery apparatuses ?k+1, . . . , ?k+m?1 receive a share [b]j from the share recovery apparatus ?k. m share recovery apparatuses ?k, . . . , ?k+m?1 calculate the share [a]j by adding the share [r]j to the share [b]j.

Abstract: A secret share value of object data on which secure computation is to be performed is stored in a secure computation device, and a query which requests secure computation or secret share value of the query is input to the secure computation device. The secure computation device performs consistency verification of the secret share value of the object data and consistency verification of the query or the secret share value of the query, obtains a secret share value of a calculation result by performing secure computation in accordance with the query or the secret share value of the query which passed the consistency verification by using the secret share value of the object data which passed the consistency verification, and outputs the secret share value of the calculation result.

Abstract: A secret computation system is a secret computation system for performing computation while keeping data concealed, and comprises a cyphertext generation device that generates cyphertext by encrypting the data, a secret computation device that generates encrypted basic statistics by performing secret computation of predetermined basic statistics using the cyphertext while keeping the cyphertext concealed, and a computation device that generates decrypted basic statistics by decrypting the encrypted basic statistics and performs predetermined computation using the decrypted basic statistics.

Abstract: A share [x]i of plaintext x in accordance with Shamir's secret sharing scheme is expressed by N shares [x0]i, . . . , [xN?1]i, and each share generating device Ai obtains a function value ri=Pm(i(?))(si) of a seed si, obtains a first calculated value ?i=?(i, i(?))[xi(?)]i+ri using a Lagrange coefficient ?(i, i(?)), a share [xi(?)]i, and the function value ri, and outputs the first calculated value ?i to a share generating device Ai(?). Each share generating device Ai accepts a second calculated value ?i(+), obtains a third calculated value zi=?(i, i(+))[xi]i+?i(+) using a Lagrange coefficient ?(i, i(+)), a share [xi]i, and the second calculated value ?i(+), and obtains information containing the seed si and the third calculated value zi as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi.

Abstract: In a temperature control apparatus for controlling the temperature of a load by supplying high-temperature circulating liquid to the load, a device in which a helical channel portion of a first heat exchange channel through which circulating liquid flows is housed in a second heat exchange channel formed of a channel space in a hollow shell through which coolant flows is used as a heat exchanger for cooling the circulating liquid, cylindrical members are individually fitted on an inflow channel portion and an outflow channel portion connected to opposite ends of the helical channel portion of the first heat exchange channel, and the cylindrical members are each fixed to the shell of the heat exchanger with a weld.

Abstract: An extraction unit (21) treats two or more consecutive frames of a plurality of frames constituting video data as a time-window frame, and extracts a plurality of time-window frames from the video data so as to cause at least one frame to be overlappingly included in adjacent time-window frames. A tracking unit (22) treats each time-window frame as a target time-window frame, and tracks target objects in the target time-window frame to generate a tracking result. An integration unit (23) integrates tracking results generated in individual time-window frames, based on a frame overlappingly included in more than one time-window frame, to generate an integration result.