Abstract: A secure computation device obtains concealed information {M(i0, . . . , iS?1)} of a table M(i0, . . . , iS?1) having one-variable function values as its members. It is to be noted that M(ib, 0, . . . , ib, S?1) generated by substituting counter values ib, 0, . . . , ib, S?1 into the table M(i0, . . . , iS?1) represents a matrix Mb, ?, ?, which is any one of Mb, 2, 1, . . . , Mb, 3, 2. The secure computation device obtains concealed information {Mb, ?, ?} by secure computation using concealed information {ib, 0}, . . . , {ib, S?1} and the concealed information {M(i0, . . . , iS?1)}, and obtains concealed information {Mb, ?, MU} of a matrix Mb, ?, MU, which is obtained by execution of a remaining process including those processes among a process Pj, 1, a process Pj, 2, a process Pj, 3, and a process Pj, 4, that are performed subsequent to a process P?, ?.

Abstract: A graph generation unit (21) generates a tracking graph by setting, as a node, each of a plurality of target objects detected in a plurality of frames constituting video data, and creating an edge between two consecutive frames to connect target objects. A vector calculation unit (22) calculates a velocity vector of a target object detected in a target frame, based on a correspondence between the target object detected in the target frame and a target object detected in a previous frame of the target frame. A cost calculation unit (23) calculates a cost of an edge connecting a target object in the target frame and a target object in a next frame of the target frame in the tracking graph. A correspondence determination unit (24) determines a correspondence between a target object in the target frame and a target object in the next frame, based on the tracking graph and the cost.

Abstract: At least any one of input keys KA0, KA1, KB?0, and KB?1 is set so that the input keys KA0, KA1, KB?0, and KB?1 which satisfy KA1?KA0=KB?1?KB?0=di are obtained, and an output key Kig(I(A), I(B)) corresponding to an output value gi(I(A), I(B)) is set by using the input keys KA0, KA1, KB?0, and KB?1, where input values of a gate that performs a logical operation are I(A), I(B)?{0, 1}, an output value of the gate is gi(I(A), I(B))?{0, 1}, an input key corresponding to the input value I(A) is KAI(A), and an input key corresponding to the input value I(B) is KB?I(B).

Abstract: Pi and P+ have stored a+?{a0, a1, a2} and b+?{b0, b1, b2} therein, and Pi and P? have stored a??A? and b??B? therein. Here, P+?P(i+1)mod3, P?=P(i?1)mod3, and a and b are arbitrary values and satisfy a=a0+a1+a2 and b=b0+b1+b2, where A? is a complement of a+ in {a0, a1, a2} and B? is a complement of b+ in {b0, b1, b2}. Pi and P+ share r+, Pi and P? share r?, and Pi calculates c+=(a++a?)(b++b?)?a?b?+r+?r?. Pi sends c+ to P+.

Abstract: A secret sharing value of a value represented by a “first target bit string” is used to obtain a secret sharing value of a value represented by a “first check bit string” obtained by setting a value of the most significant bit of the “first target bit string” to a value of a “first check bit” that is lower than the most significant bit. Here, the “first target bit string” corresponds to a null value when the most significant bit is 1 and corresponds to a real number when the most significant bit is 0. Next, the secret sharing value of the value represented by the “first check bit string” is used to obtain secret sharing values of bit values of the least significant bit to “first check bit” of the “first check bit string”.

Abstract: An inconsistency in shares is detected with a small volume of communications traffic. n inconsistency detecting devices generate random numbers si and make the random numbers si public. The n inconsistency detecting devices generate a common random number s which is the sum total of the random numbers s0, . . . , sn?1. The n inconsistency detecting devices calculate shares [c]i. The n inconsistency detecting devices generate shares [r]i, each of which would become a random number r by reconstruction. The n inconsistency detecting devices calculate shares [d]i, each of which would become a judgment value d by reconstruction. One inconsistency detecting device receives shares [d]1, . . . , [d]n?1 from n?1 inconsistency detecting devices. The one inconsistency detecting device restores n?k shares [d]?k, . . . , [d]?n?1 from k shares [d]0, . . . , [d]k?1. The one inconsistency detecting device judges, for j=k, . . . , n?1, whether or not a share [d]j and a share [d]?j coincide with each other.

Abstract: A combination of secure texts of values “a”, “b” and “c” having a relationship c=ab is efficiently generated. A secure text generation part 12 generates secure texts [xi] of xi satisfying xi=f(ki), and secure texts [yi] of yi satisfying yi=g(ki), for i=0, . . . , m. A fragment generation part 13 generates ?i decrypted from [xi]?[ai] and ?i decrypted from [yi]?[bi], for i=1, . . . , m, and calculates [ci]+?i[bi]+?i[ai]+?i?i and generates secure texts [z1], . . . , [zm]; and A random number synthesizing part 14 generates a secure text [z0] using different values k0, . . . , km and secure texts [z1], . . . , [zm].

Abstract: A speaker box for accommodating a speaker, including an outlet port provided avoiding an area corresponding to a center portion of the speaker, in a first side surface section of the speaker box which is parallel to a center axis of the speaker, and an inlet port provided avoiding an area corresponding to the center portion of the speaker, in a second side surface section of the speaker box which is opposed to the first side surface section via the speaker.

Abstract: A light source unit according to an embodiment comprises: a support member that supports a heat generator, a heat transfer member connected to the support member, and a heat dissipating member connected to the heat transfer member all of which are provided inside a space formed by a case and a cover. The heat dissipating member is arranged to extend from the inside of the space to an outside of the space via a space sandwiched by the case and the cover.

Abstract: The present invention can be efficiently applied to secure computation and can achieve a low probability of successful tampering. A tampering detection device includes a parameter storage storing parameters ?ijk for uniformly mapping from two elements of a ring Rq to one element of the ring Rq, a division part 12 dividing N values a0, . . . , aN?1 into sets of q values to generate value vectors A0, . . . , A??1, a generation part 14 generating a checksum c, and a verification part 15 comparing a verification value generated by using the value vectors A0, . . . , A??1 with the checksum c to determine whether or not any of the values a0, . . . , aN?1 has been tampered with. Here, N and q are integers greater than or equal to 2 and ? is a minimum integer greater than or equal to N/q.

Abstract: A power is computed at high speed with a small number of communication rounds. A secret computation system that includes three or more secret computation apparatuses computes a share [a?] of the ?-th power of data “a” from a share [a] of data “a” while data “a” is concealed. The share [a] of data “a” and an exponent ? are input to an input unit (step S11). A local operation unit computes the pu-th power of a share [at] of the t-th power of data “a” without communication with the other secret computation apparatuses (step S12). A secret computation unit uses secret computation that requires communication with the other secret computation apparatuses to compute a multiplication in which at least one of the multiplicands is [a(t*p{circumflex over (?)}u)], the computation result of the local operation unit, to obtain the share [a?] (step S13). An output unit outputs the share [a?] (step S14).

Abstract: An electronic device has a first device holder and a second device holder each having a heat generating device attached thereto, a first heat conductive plate and a second heat conductive plate which are connected to the first and second device holders, respectively, a first heat dissipating fin disposed by the side of the second device holder which is disposed adjacent to the first device holder, a second heat dissipating fin disposed adjacent to the first heat dissipating fin in the same direction as the first heat dissipating fin, two first heat pipes which connect the first device holder with the first heat dissipating fin so that heat can be conducted therebetween, and a second heat pipe which connects the second device holder and the second heat dissipating fin so that heat can be conducted therebetween and which is disposed between the two first heat pipes.

Abstract: A concealed-decision-tree computation system includes a user apparatus and 0th to (n?1)-th server apparatuses, where n is a predetermined positive integer. The user apparatus secret-shares data D into n shares [D]j (j=0, . . . , n?1) and sends the n shares [D]j (j=0, . . . , n?1) to the 0th to (n?1)-th server apparatuses, respectively. The 0th to (n?1)-th server apparatuses use the n shares [D]j (j=0, n?1) to perform secret cooperation computation to obtain n shares [out]0, . . . , [out]n-1 of a value “out” corresponding to the data D in a predetermined decision tree and send the n shares [out]0, . . . , [out]n-1 to the user apparatus. The user apparatus uses at least k shares out of the n received shares [out]0, . . . , [out]n-1 to restore the value “out” corresponding to the data D in the predetermined decision tree, where k is a predetermined integer equal to or smaller than n.

Abstract: A secure text having an authentication code is efficiently created. A key generation part 12 generates secure texts ([x], [?], [?]) of “x”, “?” and “?” that are values satisfying x?=?. A secure text generation part 13 generates secure texts [ai] of random values “ai” for i=1, . . . , N. An authentication code generation part 14 generates authentication codes [?(ai)] by multiplying the secure texts [ai] by the secure text [?] for i=1, . . . , N. A verification value generation part 15 generates a secure text [w] of a verification value “w” using the secure texts ([x], [?], [?]), the secure text [ai] and the authentication code [?(ai)]. A verification value determination part 16 determines whether the verification value “w” is equal to zero or not.

Abstract: A secret parallel processing device reducing communication amount includes: a randomization unit that obtains a non-randomized input sequence and outputs a randomized sequence obtained by joining the non-randomized sequence and a dummy record sequence formed of a disclosed value and subjecting the joined sequences to random replacement processing and concealed random replacement data obtained by concealing used random replacement data; a calculation unit that obtains the non-randomized sequence, the randomized sequence, and the dummy record sequence, applies a predetermined function to the sequences, and generates an output checksum for each sequence by using calculation procedure data used in the processing of applying the function; and a correctness verification unit that obtains the output checksum for each sequence and the concealed random replacement data, assesses the output checksum for each sequence, and outputs a final test result determining whether the predetermined function has been correctly appl

Abstract: A combination of secure texts of values “a”, “b” and “c” having a relationship c=ab is efficiently generated. A secure text generation part 12 generates secure texts [xi] of xi satisfying xi=f(ki), and secure texts [yi] of yi satisfying yi=g(ki), for i=0, . . . , m. A fragment generation part 13 generates ?i decrypted from [xi]?[ai] and ?i decrypted from [yi]?[bi], for i=1, . . . , m, and calculates [ci]+?i[bi]+?i[ai]+?i?i and generates secure texts [z1], . . . , [zm]; and A random number synthesizing part 14 generates a secure text [z0] using different values k0, . . . , km and secure texts [z1], . . . , [zm].

Abstract: Secret calculation including secret sorting is performed at high speed. Permutation data generation step S10 generates permutation data <?i> and <??i> so as to generate permutation data <?L>. Random ID column generation step S12 generates a random ID column [r?i] so as to generate a random ID column [r?L]. Secret random permutation step S14 performs secret random permutation of a set composed of a random ID column [r?i?1], a key column [k?i], and the random ID column [r?i] with the permutation data <?i>. Flag creation step S16 sets a flag [fj,h] by using a key [kj]=([kj,0], . . . , [kj,L?1]). Order table creation step S18 creates an order table [s?] by using the flag [fj,h]. Sort permutation generation step S20 generates sort permutation ???1L by using the random ID column [r?i], the order table [s?], a post-permutation key column [?ik?i], and a post-permutation random ID column [?ir?i].

Abstract: A speaker box for accommodating a speaker, including an outlet port provided avoiding an area corresponding to a center portion of the speaker, in a first side surface section of the speaker box which is parallel to a center axis of the speaker, and an inlet port provided avoiding an area corresponding to the center portion of the speaker, in a second side surface section of the speaker box which is opposed to the first side surface section via the speaker.

Abstract: A light source unit according to an embodiment comprises: a support member that supports a heat generator, a heat transfer member connected to the support member, and a heat dissipating member connected to the heat transfer member all of which are provided inside a space formed by a case and a cover. The heat dissipating member is arranged to extend from the inside of the space to an outside of the space via a space sandwiched by the case and the cover.

Abstract: A secret share value of object data on which secure computation is to be performed is stored in a secure computation device, and a query which requests secure computation or secret share value of the query is input to the secure computation device. The secure computation device performs consistency verification of the secret share value of the object data and consistency verification of the query or the secret share value of the query, obtains a secret share value of a calculation result by performing secure computation in accordance with the query or the secret share value of the query which passed the consistency verification by using the secret share value of the object data which passed the consistency verification, and outputs the secret share value of the calculation result.