Abstract: An electronic device has a first device holder and a second device holder each having a heat generating device attached thereto, a first heat conductive plate and a second heat conductive plate which are connected to the first and second device holders, respectively, a first heat dissipating fin disposed by the side of the second device holder which is disposed adjacent to the first device holder, a second heat dissipating fin disposed adjacent to the first heat dissipating fin in the same direction as the first heat dissipating fin, two first heat pipes which connect the first device holder with the first heat dissipating fin so that heat can be conducted therebetween, and a second heat pipe which connects the second device holder and the second heat dissipating fin so that heat can be conducted therebetween and which is disposed between the two first heat pipes.

Abstract: Secret calculation including secret random permutation is performed at high speed. In unit permutation, random permutation devices p0, . . . , pk-1 perform permutation of additive secret sharing values «a»?i of a plain text a with sub shares ??i of permutation data ?. In resharing, the random permutation device p0 generates additive secret sharing values «a»?i+1pk by using random numbers r1, . . . , rk-1 which are respectively shared with random permutation devices pj (j=1, . . . , k?1) so as to transmit the additive secret sharing values «a»?i+1pk to the random permutation device pk and each of the random permutation devices pj generates additive secret sharing values «a»?i+1pj by using random numbers rj.

Abstract: A secret quotient transfer device that can reduce the communication cost. On the assumption that u denotes a natural number and represents a boundary value, m denotes an integer that satisfies a relation m?2u, i denotes an integer from 0 to m?1, a plain text a is an integer that is equal to or greater than 0 and smaller than an arbitrary modulo p, the integers a and 0 are congruent modulo 2u, and the plain text a is expressed as a sum of m sub-shares x0, . . . , xm-1, the secret quotient transfer device computes a quotient q of the division of a total sum aZ of the sub-shares by p according to q=?(i<m)xi mod 2u.

Abstract: A secret sharing value of a value represented by a “first target bit string” is used to obtain a secret sharing value of a value represented by a “first check bit string” obtained by setting a value of the most significant bit of the “first target bit string” to a value of a “first check bit” that is lower than the most significant bit. Here, the “first target bit string” corresponds to a null value when the most significant bit is 1 and corresponds to a real number when the most significant bit is 0. Next, the secret sharing value of the value represented by the “first check bit string” is used to obtain secret sharing values of bit values of the least significant bit to “first check bit” of the “first check bit string”.

Abstract: Even when an intermediate server exists, a plurality of servers simultaneously authenticates a user securely. A user apparatus disperses a password. The user apparatus obtains a ciphertext, which is obtained by encrypting a dispersed value. The intermediate server transmits the ciphertext to an authentication server. The authentication server decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the dispersed value. The authentication server determines a verification value. The authentication server obtains a ciphertext. The intermediate server decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the verification value. The intermediate server verifies whether a sum total of the verification values is equal to 0 or not. The authentication server determines a verification value. The authentication server obtains a ciphertext. The authentication server decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the verification value. The authentication server verifies whether a sum total of the verification values is equal to 0 or not.

Abstract: An efficient share recovery technique for Shamir's secret sharing is provided. n share recovery apparatuses p1, . . . , pn-1 generate a share [r]i of a secretly shared value shared through Shamir's secret sharing, which becomes a random number r when restored. k share recovery apparatuses ?0, . . . , ?k?1 calculate a share [b]i by subtracting the share [r]i from a share [a]i. The share recovery apparatus ?k receives the shares [b]0, . . . , [b]k?1 from the share recovery apparatuses ?0, . . . , ?k?1. The share recovery apparatus ?k recovers shares [b]k, . . . , [b]k+m-1 using the shares [b]0, . . . , [b]k?1. m?1 share recovery apparatuses ?k+1, . . . , ?k+m-1 receive a share [b]j from the share recovery apparatus ?k. m share recovery apparatuses ?k, . . . , ?k+m-1 calculate the share [a]j by adding the share [r]j to the share [b]j.

Abstract: An inconsistency in shares is detected with a small volume of communications traffic. n inconsistency detecting devices generate random numbers si and make the random numbers si public. The n inconsistency detecting devices generate a common random number s which is the sum total of the random numbers s0, . . . , sn?1. The n inconsistency detecting devices calculate shares [c]i. The n inconsistency detecting devices generate shares [r]i, each of which would become a random number r by reconstruction. The n inconsistency detecting devices calculate shares [d]i, each of which would become a judgment value d by reconstruction. One inconsistency detecting device receives shares [d]1, . . . , [d]n?1 from n?1 inconsistency detecting devices. The one inconsistency detecting device restores n?k shares [d]?k, . . . , [d]?n?1 from k shares [d]0, . . . , [d]k?1. The one inconsistency detecting device judges, for j=k, . . . , n?1, whether or not a share [d]j and a share [d]?j coincide with each other.

Abstract: Each of at least three arithmetic units includes: a random number generator determining shared value [r] obtained by performing secret sharing of random number r; a randomizator using shared value [a0], . . . , [aM?1] obtained by performing secret sharing of value a0, . . . , aM?1 and shared value [r] to generate randomized shared value <a0>, . . . , <aM?1> with shared values [a0], . . . , [aM?1] and [a0r], . . . , [aM?1r] as a pair; a secret computator determining concealed function value [F([a0], . . . , [aM?1])] by executing function F including at least one secret operation while including randomized shared value <fi> of an operation target and an operation result depending on contents of secret operation into checksum C:=<f0>, . . . , <f??1>; and a correctness prover verifying correctness of function value [F([a0], . . .

Abstract: An electronic component includes a substrate configured to include a first portion that first thermal conductivity, and have a first surface and a second surface opposite to the first surface; a second portion configured to be formed inside the first portion, and have second thermal conductivity lower than the first thermal conductivity; a first terminal configured to be formed to correspond to the second portion on a side of the first surface; and a second terminal configured to be formed on a side of the second surface.

Abstract: An electronic part includes a substrate, an insulating film formed over the substrate, a first pillar electrode, a first solder formed over the first pillar electrode, a second pillar electrode, and a second solder formed over the second pillar electrode. The first pillar electrode over which the first solder is formed is formed over a first region of an insulating film including a level difference between a first opening portion and a peripheral portion of the first opening portion. The second pillar electrode over which the second solder is formed is formed over a second region of the insulating film including a second opening portion whose opening area is larger than that of the first opening portion. For example, the second pillar electrode over which the second solder is formed is formed over the second opening portion of the insulating film.

Abstract: A secret sharing system transforms shares in ramp secret sharing to shares in homomorphic secret sharing. On a data distribution apparatus, a division part divides information a into N shares fa(n) using an arbitrary ramp secret sharing scheme S1. On each of distributed data transform apparatuses, a random number selecting part generates a random number vector ri whose elements are L random numbers ri1. A first random number division part divides the random number vector into N shares fri(n) using a ramp secret sharing scheme S1. A second random number division part divides each of the L random numbers ri1 into N shares gri,1(n) using an arbitrary secret sharing scheme S2. A disturbance part generates a share Ui by using a share fa(i) and shares fr?(i). A reconstruction part reconstructs L pieces of disturbance information c1 from shares U? by using the ramp secret sharing scheme S1.

Abstract: An electronic component includes a substrate configured to include a first portion that first thermal conductivity, and have a first surface and a second surface opposite to the first surface;a second portion configured to be formed inside the first portion, and have second thermal conductivity lower than the first thermal conductivity;a first terminal configured to be formed to correspond to the second portion on a side of the first surface; and a second terminal configured to be formed on a side of the second surface.

Abstract: Secret calculation including secret random permutation is performed at high speed. In unit permutation, random permutation devices p0, . . . , pk-1 perform permutation of additive secret sharing values <<a>>?i of a plain text a with sub shares ??i of permutation data ?. In resharing, the random permutation device p0 generates additive secret sharing values <<a>>?i+1pk by using random numbers r1, . . . , rk-1 which are respectively shared with random permutation devices pj (j=1, . . . , k?1) so as to transmit the additive secret sharing values <<a>>?i+1pk to the random permutation device pk and each of the random permutation devices pj generates additive secret sharing values <<a>>?i+1pj by using random numbers rj.

Abstract: Secret calculation including secret sorting is performed at high speed. Permutation data generation step S10 generates permutation data <?i> and <??i> so as to generate permutation data <?L>. Random ID column generation step S12 generates a random ID column [r{right arrow over ( )}i] so as to generate a random ID column [r{right arrow over ( )}L]. Secret random permutation step S14 performs secret random permutation of a set composed of a random ID column [r{right arrow over ( )}i?1], a key column [k{right arrow over ( )}i], and the random ID column [r{right arrow over ( )}i] with the permutation data <?i>. Flag creation step S16 sets a flag [fj,h] by using a key [kj]=([kj,0], . . . , [kj,L?1]). Order table creation step S18 creates an order table [s{right arrow over ( )}] by using the flag [fj,h].

Abstract: A secret sharing system transforms computational secret shares to homomorphic secret shares. On a data distribution apparatus, a key selector selects K??1 keys. A pseudorandom number generator generates pseudorandom numbers from the keys. An encryption part generates a ciphertext from information using the pseudorandom numbers. A key division part divides the keys into N shares fg(n) using an arbitrary sharing. A ciphertext division part divides the ciphertext into N shares fc(n) using an arbitrary sharing. When K shares fsj(i) are input into distributed data transform apparatuses, a reconstruction part generates a reconstructed value Uj by reconstructing shares fsj(i) using the secret sharing, and when K shares fc(i) are input, generates the reconstructed value Uj by reconstructing shares fc(i) using the arbitrary sharing. A redivision part divides reconstructed value Uj into N shares fUj(n) using a homomorphic secret sharing. A transformer generates share ga(i) of the information from K? shares fUj.

Abstract: A secret quotient transfer device that can reduce the communication cost. On the assumption that u denotes a natural number and represents a boundary value, m denotes an integer that satisfies a relation m?2u, i denotes an integer from 0 to m?1, a plain text a is an integer that is equal to or greater than 0 and smaller than an arbitrary modulo p, the integers a and 0 are congruent modulo 2u, and the plain text a is expressed as a sum of m sub-shares x0, . . . , xm-1, the secret quotient transfer device computes a quotient q of the division of a total sum aZ of the sub-shares by p according to q=?(i<m)xi mod 2u.

Abstract: A secret parallel processing device reducing communication amount includes: a randomization unit that obtains a non-randomized input sequence and outputs a randomized sequence obtained by joining the non-randomized sequence and a dummy record sequence formed of a disclosed value and subjecting the joined sequences to random replacement processing and concealed random replacement data obtained by concealing used random replacement data; a calculation unit that obtains the non-randomized sequence, the randomized sequence, and the dummy record sequence, applies a predetermined function to the sequences, and generates an output checksum for each sequence by using calculation procedure data used in the processing of applying the function; and a correctness verification unit that obtains the output checksum for each sequence and the concealed random replacement data, assesses the output checksum for each sequence, and outputs a final test result determining whether the predetermined function has been correctly appl

Abstract: Even when an intermediate server exists, a plurality of servers simultaneously authenticates a user securely. A user apparatus disperses a password w? and obtains a ciphertext EncUS_i([w?]i) by encrypting a dispersed value [w?]i. The intermediate server transmits the ciphertext EncUS_i([w?]i) to an authentication server. The authentication server decrypts the ciphertext EncUS_i([w?]i) to obtain the dispersed value [w?]i. The authentication server determines a verification value qa_i(W). The authentication server obtains a ciphertext EncWS_a_i(qa_i(W)). The intermediate server decrypts the ciphertext EncWS_a_i(qa_i(W)) to obtain the verification value qa_i(W). The intermediate server verifies whether a sum total of the verification values is equal to 0 or not. The authentication server determines a verification value qa_i(a_j). The authentication server obtains a ciphertext EncS_a_iS_a_j(qa_i(a_j)).

Abstract: The present invention can be efficiently applied to secure computation and can achieve a low probability of successful tampering. A tampering detection device includes a parameter storage storing a parameter ?ijk(i=0, . . . , q?1; j=0, . . . , q?1; and k=0, . . . , q?1) for uniformly mapping from a ring R to a ring Rq, a division part 12 dividing N values a0, . . . , aN?1 into sets of q values, starting from the first value, to generate value vectors A0, . . . , A??1, a generation part 14 generating a checksum c including addition and multiplication, where vector multiplication is a function f defined by the formula given below, and a verification part comparing a verification value generated by using the value vectors A0, . . . , A??1 and vector multiplication which is the function f defined by the formula given below with the checksum c to determine whether or not any of the values a0, . . . , aN?1 has been tampered with.

Abstract: Each of at least three arithmetic units includes: a random number generator determining shared value [r] obtained by performing secret sharing of random number r; a randomizator using shared value [a0], . . . ,[aM?1] obtained by performing secret sharing of value a0, . . . , aM?1 and shared value [r] to generate randomized shared value <a0>, . . . , <aM?1> with shared values [a0], . . . , [aM?1] and [a0r], . . . , [aM?1r] as a pair; a secret computator determining concealed function value [F([a0], . . . , [aM?1])] by executing function F including at least one secret operation while including randomized shared value <f1> of an operation target and an operation result depending on contents of secret operation into checksum C:=<f0>, . . . , <f??1>; and a correctness prover verifying correctness of function value [F([a0], . . .